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ABSTRACT 
The National Guard of the United States is the nation’s oldest military service, tracing its 
roots to the Massachusetts Bay Colony of 1636. Since its inception, the Guard has 
enjoyed a unique dual-role responsibility of supporting state and federal missions, and 
while serving in every war since the American Revolution, Guardsmen and women have 
also supported domestic operations from the southwest border to Hurricane Katrina. 
Today, the Guard is a fully operational reserve, and a critical part of the national security 
framework. While fully engaged in the Global War On Terror, the Guard has also made 
great strides toward becoming the lead military agency in domestic missions, which has 
always been a key mission of the Guard, and which sets it apart from its Title X 
counterparts. Recently, the Guard has achieved increased relevance and political victories 
highlighted by the recent National Guard Empowerment Act that gave the Chief of 
National Guard Bureau membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As defense spending 
and the size of the active force is cut in a post-war environment, this thesis reviews the 
best future use of the Army National Guard, and offers alternative solutions for increased 
effectiveness, particularly in a domestic capacity.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION. SHAPING THE NATIONAL GUARD IN A 
POST-WAR ENVIRONMENT 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
In a post-war environment, what is the ideal structure of the Army National 
Guard? How can the National Guard best posture itself to ensure readiness for its 
Homeland Security (HLS) role? As the active military downsizes, can the National Guard 
shift its focus to its historic HLS mission, leaving the active component and Reserves in 
preparation for future conflicts, or will the NG continue to be utilized as an operational 
reserve, as well as a HLS force? If the Army National Guard will continue to be dual-
missioned as an operational reserve to the Army and the first response force to the 
governors, how can the ARNG be optimally organized and structured to meet these dual 
roles?  
B.  PROBLEM SPACE 
The National Guard (NG) traces its roots back to the Massachusetts Bay Colony 
militia of 1636, making it our nation’s oldest service. The NG of the United States 
consists of the Army National Guard (ARNG), officially established as a reserve 
component to the Army by the Militia Act of 1903,1 and the Air National Guard (ANG), 
established in 1947 as a separate reserve component of the U.S. Air Force.2 Guardsmen 
and women have served in every war the United States has been involved in, from the 
American Revolution to Operation Iraqi Freedom. A unique aspect of the NG, however, 
is its dual-role as an operational force under control of the governor in peacetime to be 
used to respond to natural disasters and domestic threats. The history of Guardsmen being 
used in this capacity is also extensive, and arguably homeland security has always been 
the primary focus of the NG, from service against the domestic British threat during the  
 
 
                                                 
1 Michael Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War (University Press of Kansas, 2003), xviii, xvi. 
2 Air National Guard, “Heritage,” (n.d.), http://www.ang.af.mil/history/heritage.asp. 
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American Revolution and the War of 1812, to service on the Mexican border in 1916, to 
the stationing of Guardsmen at airports, military facilities, and key infrastructure 
immediately following the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.3  
The mobilization of NG units for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has been the most extensive since World War II; 332K 
Soldiers, and 86k Airmen have been deployed overseas from a total NG force of 470k.4 
The attacks of 9/11 propelled the NG from a Cold War strategic reserve to a fully 
operational reserve and partner in the war on terror. Guardsmen have served and died 
around the globe in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and perhaps 
surprisingly, recruiting quotas have been met every year since 2003. In fact, the ARNG is 
over its authorized strength and has currently capped growth in nearly every state. The 
deployment of nearly 100% of its forces since 2003 does not come without a price, 
however. Multiple deployments utilizing equipment left deployed in theatre between 
rotations results in equipment returning worn out, damaged, or completely non-mission 
capable. Since 2003, the ARNG has been fielded $23 billion of new equipment to 
modernize the force in keeping with its active duty counterparts.5 Since many ARNG 
units have deployed to do a non-standard mission (i.e., a field artillery unit conducting a 
convoy security mission), Soldiers in these units cross-train to a new job, and have 
suffered degraded skills in their primary job as a result. Therefore, while maintaining end 
strength goals has not been a problem, the ARNG’s most precious resource, its Soldiers, 
have been impacted. Since 9/11, most ARNG Soldiers have deployed twice, for 12–18 
months, and many have deployed three or more times. Divorces and suicide rates in the 
NG are alarmingly high, and supportive employers have paid a price. To summarize, the 
                                                 
3 Ibid., xvi; Michael Doubler, “Operation Jump Start, the National Guard on the Southwest Border, 
2006–2008,” National Guard Bureau Office of Public Affairs, Historical Services Division, October 24, 
2008, 3–6; John D. Renaud, COL, National Guard Homeland Defense White Paper: September 11, 2001, 
Hurricane Katrina, and Beyond, National Guard G5, Strategic Plans and Policy, October 2005, 3. 
4 This number represents multiple deployments for some Soldiers, and does not mean to imply 89% of 
all ARNG Soldiers have deployed; in fact 60% of currently serving ARNG Soldiers have deployed at least 
once since 2003. 2011 National Guard Posture Statement, (n.d.), 
http://www.arng.army.mil/News/publications/ApostureStatements/2011_ngps.pdf. 
5 Atlanta Journal Constitution, “Iraq War Drains Guard of Equipment,” Military.com, March 8, 2006, 
http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,90278,00.html. 
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GWOT has transformed the NG into a fully operational reserve of the Army and Air 
Force, and has brought funding and modernization not seen since WWII. However, the 
GWOT has also stressed and taxed NG personnel and equipment, and has caused some to 
ask what the best use of the NG may be. 
In addition to extensive deployments to OIF and OEF, the NG has also been 
fervently working to improve its capabilities for domestic response missions, particularly 
after Hurricane Katrina. GEN McKinley, the current Chief of NGB, has listed homeland 
security as the number one priority for the NG, with support to GWOT second, as a 
reinforcement of the NG’s commitment to domestic response missions. The NG’s unique 
control by state governors during peacetime, and positioning around the country in 3,300 
armories and nearly every community makes it an obvious choice for these missions. In 
fact, the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Reserves are almost never called up 
for domestic response missions, and currently require the President’s use of the Stafford 
Act in a declared national emergency. The NG, as a Title 32 reserve component under 
state control, is much more accessible than the reserves, which are Title X. These 
domestic missions generally utilize the same equipment sets NG units deploy overseas 
with, and while they do not usually require significant training, they do take the same 
Soldiers away from home, and from their employers. Thus, the NG Soldier/Airmen is 
faced with the challenge of being called up multiple times during a deployment cycle for 
State Active Duty (SAD), and the NG must deal with the competing interests of training 
and equipping for both missions. In short, the NG is busier than it has ever been, and as 
the active component reduces end strength post-war as planned (50,000–90,000 planned 
cuts in the Army by 2015), utilization of the NG will become even more critical.  
This paper offers alternatives for shaping the ARNG for success in the future. As 
DoD downsizes and cuts budgets in a post-war environment, the ARNG will likely also 
experience budget, equipment and manning reductions. However, to avoid the pitfall of 
“fighting the last war,” the United States must remain ready for future conflicts. As the 
NG shifts its focus to domestic/HLS missions, it must remain ready to deploy in support 
of the active forces for future contingencies. If this prediction is accepted, DoD must 
realign forces across components (active, NG, and reserves) to be successfully poised for 
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national and homeland defense. We live in an uncertain world, and today’s allies may be 
tomorrow’s enemies. The post-war realignment must maintain maximum flexibility 
within the U.S. military to respond to any event, anywhere.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much debate has ensued about the role of the NG in HLS, as well as discussion 
about statutory requirements, the NG’s relationship with NORTHCOM, and the 
command and control structure of the NG. Specific issues, such as the shrinking DoD 
budget and its associated effects on the NG, elevation of the Chief of National Guard 
Bureau (NGB) to 4 stars and inclusion on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, training of dual-status 
commanders capable of commanding Title X (federal) and Title 32 (state-controlled, 
federally funded) forces in a domestic response mission, and the assignment of NG 
Officers to NORTHCOM are currently occurring. What has not been widely discussed is 
the future of the NG, post-war and assuming the role as the primary provider of military 
support to civil authorities, and whether or not the NG is correctly postured to assume 
this role. The existing research can be generally lumped into the following categories: 
Role of the NG in homeland security and defense, the NG’s relationship with 
NORTHCOM, and command and control (C2) of the NG.  
1. Role of the NG in Homeland Security and Defense 
Much has been written about the proper role of the NG in homeland security, and 
most authors agree that homeland security and domestic response is a viable mission for 
the NG. In fact, Frantz6 and Steenson7 suggest this should be the primary role of the NG. 
NG forces were called to duty within hours of the 9/11 attacks, with 5,000 ARNG 
Soldiers put on duty guarding key infrastructure and military installations, and 8,200 
more assigned to guard the nation’s airports.8 After Hurricane Katrina, 55,000 NG 
                                                 
6 T. C. Frantz, “The National Guard—DoD’s Logical Homeland Security “First Responder” for the 
21st Century” (master’s thesis, USMC Command and Staff College, 2005). 
7 Michael Steenson, “The NG: DOD’s Interagency Bridge to Homeland Security” (master’s thesis, 
National Defense University, 2008). 
8 Renaud, National Guard Homeland Defense White Paper: September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina, 
and Beyond, 3.  
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Soldiers/Airmen were deployed to Louisiana. Therefore, while the NG has been 
transitioning from a strategic Cold-War reserve to a fully operational reserve in the war 
on terror, the level of operational tempo (OPTEMPO) experienced by the NG for 
domestic response missions has also been unprecedented. In 2005, Frantz argues, “the 
Pentagon should formally refocus the National Guard’s primary mission to homeland 
security issues, specifically consequence management matters.”9 He also recommends 
regionalizing the NG into 11 regions for command and control (C2), to correspond with 
FEMA regions. Fitzgerald also recommends this idea of regionalization.10 Stevenson 
discussed the role of the NG in his thesis entitled, “Enhancing the Effectiveness of NG 
support of Civil Authorities by Improving Interagency Coordination.”11 In his essay, he 
discusses legal and structural challenges associated with NG supporting federal partners, 
but concludes by saying “The National Guard is positioned and capable to provide 
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in an efficient and effective manner.”12 
Finally, Steenson also argues the NG should be given primary responsibility for 
homeland security, and funded separately for this mission, while being maintained as an 
operational reserve of the Army.13 Overall, there is agreement that the NG plays a pivotal 
role in Homeland Security. The NG is uniquely positioned to act as military first 
responders since its forces are dispersed throughout the nation in 3,300 armories, and NG 
Soldiers reside in virtually every community in the nation. Also unique to the NG is the 
dual-role mission it has handled since its inception in 1636, as under Title 32 (state 
control) during peacetime, with the ability to be mobilized under Title X (federal) for 
overseas deployment. Michael Doubler, a retired ARNG officer, has written extensively 
about the Guard’s use in overseas deployments, from the NG’s inception as the 
Massachusetts Bay colony militia in 1636, service in the American Revolutionary War 
                                                 
9 Frantz, “The National Guard—DoD’s Logical Homeland Security “First Responder” for the 21st 
Century,” 6. 
10 Shawn Fitzgerald, “Organizing the National Guard to Provide Effective Domestic Operations” 
(thesis proposal, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 11–12. 
11 William Stevenson, “Enhancing the Effectiveness of NG Support of Civil Authorities by Improving 
Interagency Coordination” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). 
12 Ibid., 5. 
13 Steenson, “The NG: DOD’s Interagency Bridge to Homeland Security.” 
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and every U.S. conflict since,14 and also the Guard’s utilization as a homeland security 
force during its deployment to the Mexican border in 1916.15 The Guard’s response after 
Hurricane Katrina was “praised for its size and comprehensiveness,” and “criticized for 
its perceived slowness in the House lessons-learned report, “fragmented deployment 
system” in the White House report, and for its lack of coordination with other military 
responses in the Senate report,” according to a RAND study conducted for the U.S. 
Army. This report also recommended the designation of NG units in the Army Forces 
Generation Model (ARFORGEN) as HLS forces to ensure adequate numbers of NG 
forces remain at home for domestic use.16 The major gap in the literature is how the NG 
can balance the HLS mission with its obligations as an operational reserve to the Army 
and subsequent overseas deployments. In other words, should the NG be focused on its 
HLS mission, or war-fighting mission overseas? 
2. Relationship with NORTHCOM 
U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is the military combatant command 
established in 2002 as the primary military entity responsible for homeland security and 
defense, and for military support to civil authorities for domestic response. Much has 
been written about the relationship between the NG and NORTHCOM, since 
NORTHCOM relies on NG forces for most of its air defense and domestic response 
missions, but NG forces serving in a Title 32 (state-controlled) status are not under the 
C2 of NORTHCOM.  
Topp discussed the optimal relationship between the NG and NORTHCOM in 
2006.17 In discussing the legal foundation for the control of NG forces by governors until 
mobilized to Title X status for federal service, and the political implications of the 
President federalizing NG troops without the consent of the governor, Topp recommends 
a somewhat status-quo solution, in which NG troops remain in a Title 32 status. He 
                                                 
14 Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, xviii. 
15 Doubler, “Operation Jump Start, the National Guard on the Southwest Border, 2006–2008,” 21. 
16 RAND Arroyo Center, “Hurricane Katrina Lessons for Army Planning and Operations,” 21, 58–60. 
17 Peter Topp, “What Should Be the Relationship Between the NG and U.S. NORTHCOM in Civil 
Support Operations following Catastrophic Events” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006).  
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discusses the use of dual-status commanders who can be properly trained to command 
forces in Title X and 32, a program currently well underway within the NG, and the 
inclusion of a NG Brigadier General on NORTHCOM’s staff as the J-3 Operations 
directorate.18 There are currently several National Guard Brigadier Generals at 
NORTHCOM, and in fact, the Deputy Commander, Missouri Guardsman, LTG Frank 
Grass, was recently selected as the incoming chief of NGB.19  
Dahlman also discusses the relationship between NORTHCOM and the NG in his 
thesis from the Army War College in 2008.20 Again acknowledging the key role the NG 
plays in NORTHCOM’s mission, Dahlman discusses the associated challenges with the 
NG’s de-centralized leadership to 54 Adjutant Generals (TAG) and governors, all with 
their own priorities. He concludes the state’s Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) should 
commit to increased joint training, training and exercise opportunities with 
NORTHCOM, training in the National Incident Command System (NIMS) for NG 
commanders, and for increased communication between NORTHCOM and the states.21 
Many have recommended the NORTHCOM commander be a Guardsman, including 
Steenson,22 and the recently passed National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2012 
calls for either the Deputy or the Commander of NORTHCOM to be a Guardsman. While 
the importance of the relationship is often discussed, a clear-cut solution to the problem 
of tasking a Headquarters (HQ) (NORTHCOM) to accomplish its mission with non-
organic personnel has not been made. Frantz recommends the permanent assignment of 
NG forces to NORTHCOM23, but this is neither a popular nor a likely outcome.  
                                                 
18 Topp, “What Should Be the Relationship Between the NG and U.S. NORTHCOM in Civil Support 
Operations following Catastrophic Events,” xx. 
19 Frank Grass, “LTG Grass Official Biography,” NORTHCOM, November 3, 2010, 
http://www.northcom.mil/leaders_html/docs/LTG%20Grass%203%20Nov%2010.pdf. 
20 Richard Dahlman, “The State JFHQ-Getting It Right with NORTHCOM” (master’s thesis, The 
Army War College, 2008). 
21 Ibid., xx. 
22 Steenson, “The NG: DOD’s Interagency Bridge to Homeland Security,” xx.  
23 Frantz, “The National Guard—DoD’s Logical Homeland Security “First Responder” for the 21st 
Century.” 
 8
Overall, the literature identifies the problem that while NORTHCOM has the 
military responsibility for HLS, it does not possess the proper authority over the NG to 
conduct its missions effectively. Unity of command, a key principle of war, is not 
achieved, as NG Soldiers responsible to conduct NORTHCOM’s HLS mission are not 
assigned to NORTHCOM while in a Title 32 status. Recommendations like assigning NG 
General Officers to NORTHCOM have been implemented, yet even if NORTHCOM is 
eventually commanded by a NG officer, he will still not achieve C2 over the NG forces 
assigned to the 54 states and territories. Solutions like regionalization of the NG, being 
proposed by Fitzgerald, and any suggestion of placing NG forces under NORTHCOM 
control full-time will be met with stiff resistance from 54 governors, and will dilute the 
historical foundation of the NG created by the founding fathers who were leery of a large 
standing Army and federal control. The NDAA signed in 2008 authorizing presidential 
authority to mobilize NG troops without the governor’s consent met with immediate 
resistance and was quickly repealed. The use of dual-status commanders capable of 
commanding forces in both Title X and Title 32 status is the current model, which has 
been agreed upon by NORTHCOM, the State TAG’s, and the Governor’s council.24 
However, little to no discussion has occurred about changing the statutory authority of 
NG forces to address the ultimate issue, and any recommendation to that end is unlikely 
to gain much traction.  
3. C2 of the NG 
As discussed above, the NG consists of the Army and Air National Guard in 54 
states and territories, each with its own TAG and governor, who have their own priorities. 
While the Chief of NGB has declared domestic response a core competency of the NG, 
NGB is a Title X activity, responsible for administering resources, communicating with 
DoD, and advising DoD and the JCS on NG matters. The caveat is the states have a 
vested interest in the relationship with NGB as the provider of resources. While most 
governors and TAGs continue to embrace the historical domestic mission of the Guard, in 
                                                 
24 Jeff Burkett, “Command and Control of Military Forces in the Homeland,” JFQ 51 (4th Quarter 
2008), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a516643.pdf.  
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which it has been involved since its inception, some view it as a competing interest with 
the NG’s federal mission as a provider of ready units and personnel to the war-fight.  
Stevenson describes some of these challenges in his essay, discussing the fact 
NGB does not have the authority to conduct federal interagency coordination, and he 
raises concerns voiced by many that the current OPTEMPO of the NG cannot be 
sustained.25 NGB’s lack of control over the 358.2k NG forces assigned nationwide 
further exacerbates the problem of NORTHCOM’s C2. For instance, liaison between 
NGB and NORTHCOM is advocated by many but will not address the lack of command 
relationship. Even assigning a NG commander to NORTHCOM, as Steenson 
recommends,26 will not change the relationship with the states. Without a complete 
overhaul of the Title 32 statute, which is based on a long and valued history of states’ 
rights, NGB and NORTHCOM will continue to be coordinating vs. command and control 
HQ.  
The recently signed NDAA placing the Chief of NGB on the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
is seen as a victory for increased relevance of the NG, but does not address the statutory 
command and control issues involved. As a Title X activity, NGB does not have C2 over 
the 425,000 Soldiers and Airmen of the NG generally serving in a Title 32 status, 
although NGB does have the authority to source NG units for Title X activation. Overall, 
the gap described above with the command relationship between NORTHCOM, NGB (a 
federal entity) and the NG forces of 54 states and territories is a statutory issue. Many 
recommendations have been discussed, but none address the basic command structure 
issue that the states do not report to NGB or to NORTHCOM, but rather are run as 54 
independent military forces within their state, under control of their governors in Title 32 
status until mobilized under Title X for federal deployment.  
                                                 
25 Stevenson, “Enhancing the Effectiveness of NG Support of Civil Authorities by Improving 
Interagency Coordination.”  
26 Steenson, “The NG: DOD’s Interagency Bridge to Homeland Security,” 23. 
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4. Summary and Conclusion 
The literature reviewed demonstrates some challenges in statutory, historical, and 
relationships that can be improved for the NG to become an effective partner in this 
endeavor, and several policy level recommendations, some of which have already 
occurred. As the NG recovers from nearly 10 years at war, and positions itself to be the 
primary provider of HLS forces, many unanswered questions remain as to whether the 
NG is being properly utilized, and if it is properly suited to accomplish this mission 
successfully. While much data is available about the historical use of the NG for 
HLS/domestic response, a lack of research exists about the competing impacts of the 
NG’s simultaneous use overseas in the GWOT. While the NG positions itself as the 
primary provider of military forces to NORTHCOM, the ongoing issue of federal control 
of NG forces has not been resolved. It is too early to tell what the post-war force shaping 
and budget cuts will bring across DoD, and a lack of research on how the NG should 
position itself to successfully accomplish its historical HLS mission, and still be ready to 
answer the nation’s call for future conflicts.  
D. METHODS 
This thesis uses the policy options methodology to analyze three possible 
alternatives for the ARNG, identifies strengths and weaknesses associated with each one, 
and recommends a solution. This method was chosen as the best way to analyze the 
issues identified above, identify possible solutions, and measure them against defined 
criteria. In short, many different options exist for aligning the ARNG for its HLS 
mission, and the policy options methodology recommends a proposed “best” solution. 
The proposed solution is a policy recommendation for a realignment of force structure 
within the active Army, the ARNG, and the United States Army Reserve (USAR).  
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II. BACKGROUND 
THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in 
times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of 
superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal 
peace of the Confederacy. 
–Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 2927 
Before identifying the best future use and structure of the ARNG, it is first 
important to understand the command structure, statutory authority and history of the 
ARNG and U.S. Army Reserve. This chapter also describes the use of the ARNG and 
Reserves in the GWOT, and discusses ARNG domestic operations.  
A. COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE NG 
The National Guard of the United States is the oldest U.S. military service, tracing 
its roots to the Massachusetts Bay Colony Militia formed in 1636. Due to its earliest 
foundations as a state militia, and because of the founding fathers’ aversion to a large 
standing army and support for state’s rights, the NG is historically linked to the 54 states 
and territories. In peacetime, NG Soldiers are in a Title 32 status, under the command of 
The Adjutant General (TAG) for their state, who works directly for the governor. In most 
cases, state statute requires the applicant to hold a minimum grade, and the governor in 
most states selects the position (TAGs are elected in Vermont and South Carolina).28 The 
NG is largely federally funded, and the guard’s full-time force is predominantly 
comprised of federal employees, dual-status technicians and AGR (Active Guard and 
Reserve). However, the TAG is a state employee who has no military superior within 
state boundaries. The TAG is the approval authority for all personnel and administrative 
actions within the state’s military department, and exercises control of all the employees 
within the state’s military department while in a non-federalized status. While each state 
has a Title X (federal) United States Property and Fiscal Officer (USPFO) who exercises 
                                                 
27 Alexander Hamilton, “The Federalist Papers: Concerning the Militia,” Federalist No. 29, The 
Library of Congress, Thomas, January 10, 1788, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_29.html. 
28 Wikipedia, “Adjutant General,” (n.d.), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adjutant_general#United_States. 
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oversight over federal property and funds, an active duty Senior Army Advisor 
(SRAAG), and an Inspector General (IG), the TAG is not bound by the decisions or 
recommendations of these individuals. Also, the TAG has no command relationship with 
either the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB), or the Commander of U.S. 
Northern Command (NORTHCOM). These two entities have no command authority over 
Title 32 NG Soldiers until they are federalized under Title X status.  
B. KEY LEGISLATION SHAPING THE NG 
The National Guard of the United States was officially authorized by the 
Constitution in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 15 that authorized the state militias “to 
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasion.” The Militia 
Act of 1792 provided the President the authority to federalize NG troops, and provided 
federal standards for the state militias. The Insurrection Act of 1807 established 
Presidential authority to deploy federal military troops within the United States to “put 
down lawlessness, insurrection, and rebellion.” The Militia Act of 1862 provided for 
persons of African descent to serve in the militia. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 
restricted the use of federal troops in domestic law enforcement operations; however, 
U.S. Coast Guard personnel in their peacetime role under the Department of Homeland 
Security, and NG troops not in a federal status are specifically exempted from this statute. 
The Militia Act of 1903 established the National Guard of the United States as the 
primary organized reserve force for the U.S. armed forces. The National Defense Act of 
1916 established the citizen-Soldier concept, and combined the ARNG, the Army 
Reserve, and the regular Army into the Army of the United States in time of war. This act 
mandated the use of the term “National Guard,” increased the number of yearly drills 
from 24 to 48, increased annual training days from five to 15, and authorized drill pay for 
the first time. The National Defense Act Amendments of 1920 established that the Militia 
Bureau (later the National Guard Bureau) chief would be a NG officer, and reorganized 
the World War I divisions. The National Defense Act of 1947 established the Air 
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National Guard of the United States, underneath the National Guard Bureau (NGB).29 
The John Warner Defense Authorization Act of 2007 changed federal law to enable the 
President to take control of a state’s NG forces without the governor’s consent during 
domestic emergencies, which was seen as a dangerous shift away from state’s rights, and 
was opposed in a letter signed by all 50 governors.30 The 2008 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) repealed this provision. However, the President is still able to 
call up NG forces for federal deployment during congressionally sanctioned national 
emergency or war.31 This NDAA also elevated the Chief of NGB to a 4-star billet, and 
mandated the Commander or Deputy Commander of NORTHCOM be a NG Officer. The 
Chief of the National Guard Bureau’s role is defined in this NDAA as follows.32 
(1)  “A principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on matters involving non-federalized National 
Guard forces and on other matters as determined by the Secretary of 
Defense; and 
(2)  The principal adviser to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff 
of the Army, and to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff 
of the Air Force, on matters relating to the National Guard, the Army 







                                                 
29 Wikipedia, “National Guard of the United States,” (n.d.), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Guard_of_the_United_States#Laws_covering_the_National_Guard_
and_the_National_Guard_of_the_United_States  
30 Kavan Peterson, “Governors Lose in Power Struggle Over National Guard,” Stateline, January 12, 
2007, http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=170453. 
31 Wikipedia, “National Guard of the United States,” (n.d.), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Guard_of_the_United_States#cite_note-14. 




The NDAA 2012, signed into law by President Obama on December 31, 2011, 
gave the Chief of NGB membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and created a Vice Chief 
of NGB at the grade of Lieutenant General. This act also contained an amendment 
requiring that fully qualified officers of the National Guard be considered for 
appointment to the position of Commander, Army North and Air Force North 
Command.33  
C. HISTORY OF THE NG 
In addition to sending forces to every conflict the United States has even been 
involved in, from the American Revolution to Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom, 
the NG has arguably always been focused on HLS and Homeland Defense (HLD), from 
repelling British invaders during the American Revolutionary War, and the War of 1812, 
to the skies over New York and Washington, DC after 9/11. One could say this is the 
primary purpose of the NG, as a local militia readily accessible to the state governors to 
protect its citizenry from outside threats, and respond to natural disasters and state 
emergencies. NG forces have been used to man defensive coastal positions from 1907 
through World War II. NG troops were deployed at the beginning of both World Wars to 
protect critical infrastructure from acts of sabotage, and in 1916 to patrol the Mexican 
border. ARNG missile men operated nuclear armed Nike Missile launcher sites during 
the Cold War, and in the late 1990s, the NG formed civil support teams capable of an 
early response to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attacks. In 
addition, Soldiers and Airmen of the NG have deployed for riot control and to enforce 
southern school integration, to assist the LAPD during the Rodney King riots, and more 
than 50,000 Soldiers representing every state deployed to New Orleans and Mississippi 
after Hurricane Katrina.34  
On September 11, 2001, at 9:37am, Flight 77 roared over the NGB just outside of 
Washington, DC, and seconds later, crashed into the Pentagon, which killed 189 people 
                                                 
33 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, House of Representatives Conference 
Report, Sections 511, 512, and 518, (2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112hrpt329/pdf/CRPT-
112hrpt329-pt1.pdf. 
34 The National Guard, “About the Army National Guard,” (n.d.), 
http://www.nationalguard.mil/about/arng.aspx. 
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instantly, including two ARNG officers. A number of ARNG medical personnel 
attending a meeting at the Pentagon became involved in rescue and treatment of 
casualties. The next day, military policemen from the Maryland and Virginia ARNG 
were on duty helping form a security perimeter around the Pentagon. In fact, the first 
responders in the war on terror started that day were not Special Forces or Ranger units, 
but men and women of the New York National Guard who responded immediately, much 
like the minutemen they traced their history back to, some arriving in uniform and others 
still in civilian clothes, assisting policemen, firefighters, and medical personnel.35 Within 
hours following 9/11, more than 3,000-armed National Guardsmen were deployed to 
guard critical infrastructure and military installations around the nation, with 5,000 on 
duty within 10 days. President Bush authorized a partial mobilization of the Reserves on 
September 15, 2001 for a collection of homeland defense missions known as “Operation 
Noble Eagle.” These missions consisted of air defense around major cities, and during the 
9/11 aftermath, fighters from the New York Air National Guard patrolled the skies over 
New York City and Washington, DC. Also by order of the President, 8,200 armed ARNG 
Soldiers were put on duty in the nation’s airports within days of 9/11 before handing over 
duties to the newly established Transportation Security Administration (TSA).36 Much of 
this response was in military terms a “show of force,” designed to deter follow-on attacks 
and restore public confidence in the nation’s security.  
NG Soldiers and Airmen have fought and died in every war the United States has 
been involved since the American Revolutionary War, and the NG has also been 
extensively involved in domestic support missions since its inception. Since 9/11, the 
ARNG has deployed 338,000 Soldiers of an authorized strength of 362,000, and has lost 
more than 600 Soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. The tempo of deployments have caused 
the NG to transition to a fully operational reserve, receiving billions of dollars of new 
equipment, extensive cross training, and extensive funding for the past 10 fiscal years. As 
a result of this transition, political push by the National Guard Association (NGAUS) and 
                                                 
35 Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, xiv–xx.  
36 Renaud, National Guard Homeland Defense White Paper: September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina, 
and Beyond, 3. 
 16
key Senatorial support, the National Guard Empowerment Act was passed in 2012, 
despite opposition from all four service chiefs and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). 
GEN McKinley, the first Chief of NGB to sit on the JCS in 2012, has listed his three 
priorities for the NG as the following. 
Your National Guard:37  
 HOMELAND DEFENDERS 
 The Military's First Responders ... A Guard member in every zip 
code 
 PROVEN in BATTLE 
 America's Warriors ... Indispensable, Ready, and Accessible 
 POSTURED for the FUTURE 
 Security America can Afford ... Paying Dividends for Four 
Centuries 
D. NG STRUCTURE 
The ARNG reached a high of 27 divisions and an authorized end strength of 
457,000 in 1989 to a current authorized end strength (force structure allowance) of 
358,000 in 2012. The ARNG structure currently consists of eight divisions located in 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Minnesota, Kansas, Texas, Indiana, California, and New York, 
and 32 Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), located across nearly every state. The BCT is the 
primary fighting element of the Army today, and consists of 3–4,000 Soldiers, a mix of 
armor and infantry units, and is self-sustaining in terms of aviation, field artillery, 
engineer, intelligence, and logistical support. The ARNG also possesses 16 Maneuver 
Enhancement Brigades, seven Battlefield Surveillance Brigades, 10 Sustainment 
Brigades, seven Fires (Artillery) Brigades, six Theatre Aviation Brigades, and 14 separate 
Functional Brigades; Engineer, Air Defense Artillery, Military Police (MP), Signal, or 
Chemical, as well as two ARNG Special Forces Groups which are located in Utah and 
Alabama.38 Table 1 depicts ARNG end strength since 1947. 
 
                                                 
37 National Guard, “National Guard Leadership,” (n.d.), http://www.nationalguard.mil/leaders/. 
38 Global Security, “Army National Guard,” (n.d.), 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/arng.htm. 
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1947 87,421 1964 381,546 1981 390,659 1998 362,459 
1948 288,427 1965 378,985 1982 409,238 1999 357,469 
1949 315,042 1966 420,924 1983 417,178 2000 353,045 
1950 324,761 1967 418,074 1984 434,702 2001 351,829 
1951 226,636 1968 389,182 1985 440,778 2002 351,078 
1952 215,341 1969 388,954 1986 446,872 2003 351,089 
1953 255,522 1970 409,192 1987 451,858 2004 342,918 
1954 318,006 1971 402,175 1988 455,182 2005 333,177 
1955 357,542 1972 387,539 1989 456,960 2006 346,288 
1956 404,403 1973 385,600 1990 444,224 2007 350,000 
1957 422,178 1974 410,682 1991 446,121 2008 362,493 
1958 394,329 1975 401,981 1992 426,528 2009 358,200 
1959 399,427 1976 375,706 1993 409,919 2010 358,200 
1960 401,765 1977 363,777 1994 396,928 2011 358,200 
1961 393,807 1978 347,340 1995 374,930   
1962 360,970 1979 346,974 1996 369,976   
1963 361,080 1980 368,254 1997 370,046   
 
The numbers in bold reflect large numbers of NG Soldiers serving on active duty 
during the Korean War, the Berlin Crisis, Vietnam, and the Gulf War, and 
therefore not counted in the NG rolls.39 Numbers in Red reflect a peak followed 
by a decrease. Numbers in italics reflect actual assigned end strength from 2000–
2005.40 
Table 1.   ARNG Strength, 1947–2011 
E. HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE USAR 
The United States Army Reserve (USAR) was formed on April 23, 1908 to 
provide a reserve of medical officers to the Army. The National Defense Act of 1920 
reorganized the U.S. Army into the regular Army, the National Guard, and an Organized 
Officer Reserve and Enlisted Reserve Corps, which later became the Army Reserve. As 
with the National Guard, the role of the USAR has been greatly enhanced since 
transitioning to an operational reserve after 9/11. The USAR consists of 205,281 Soldiers 
located in 1,100 Reserve Centers around the nation, with 15,584 Army Reservists 
currently deployed around the world, and 196,711 Soldiers deployed since 9/11. The core 
                                                 
39 Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 249, 276, 345. 
40 Congressional Budget Office, “A CBO Study, Recruiting, Retention, and Future Levels of Military 
Personnel,” October 1, 2006, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7626/10-05-Recruiting.pdf. 
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competency of the USAR is providing support units to the Army for federal mobilization, 
and its units include theatre support, civil affairs, engineering, training divisions, and 
chemical and biological detection companies. It contains more than two-thirds of the 
Army’s medical brigades, civil affairs units, dental units, combat support hospitals, and 
nearly one-half of the Army’s MP, and medical and supply units.41 An agreement in 1993 
after the Gulf War and the end of the Cold War resulted in a reduction of the active 
component, ARNG, and USAR. The agreement also reorganized the Army force 
structure between the two reserve components, which left the combat arms units (armor, 
infantry, field artillery, and special forces) in the ARNG, and combat support (aviation, 
engineer, transportation) and combat service support (finance, adjutant medical) in the 
USAR. With about 20% of the Army’s total forces, the Army Reserve currently provides 
about half of the Army’s combat support and one-fourth of the Army’s mobilization base 
expansion capability. The Army Reserve currently consists of 15 Operational 
Commands; Medical, Civil Support, Aviation, MP, Sustainment, Signal, Engineer, 
Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, and Military Intelligence. It also has seven 
Regional Support Commands that act as peacetime administrative headquarters for 
USAR units located around the nation, four Institutional Training Commands responsible 
for replacing active duty training Soldiers while deployed, an Aviation Brigade, and two 
Training Support Commands, First United States Army East and West, responsible for 
validation of pre-mobilization training for all reserve component (ARNG and USAR) 
units.42 The 100th Infantry Battalion, 442nd Infantry Regiment, located at Fort Shafter, 
Hawaii, is the only remaining combat arms unit in the USAR, and it has been deployed to 
Iraq and Kuwait.43  
Unlike the Chief of NGB, who now sits on the JCS, the Chief of the Army 
Reserve reports directly to the Army Chief of Staff. USAR Soldiers serve in a Title X 
                                                 
41 Jack Stultz, “2011 USAR Posture Statement,” March 2011, http://issuu.com/warrior-
citizen/docs/2011-arps?mode=embed&layout=http://skin.issuu.com/v/light/layout.xml&showFlipBtn=true. 
42 Wikipedia, “United States Army Reserve,” (n.d.), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Army_Reserve. 
43 Wikipedia, “100th Infantry Battalion,” (n.d.), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/100th_Infantry_Battalion_(United_States). 
 19
status under federal control. USAR units are organized into major commands by 
functional area, or under peacetime command and control (C2) Support Commands. 
These units are not affiliated with a particular state or territory, as NG units are. “The 
Army Reserve's mission, under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, is to provide trained, equipped, 
and ready Soldiers and cohesive units to meet the global requirements across the full 
spectrum of operations. The Army Reserve is a key element in The Army multi-
component unit force, training with Active and National Guard units to ensure all three 
components work as a fully integrated team.”44 USAR forces have also been mobilized in 
large numbers for the GWOT, and have become a fully operational reserve to the U.S. 
Army since 9/11. Unlike the NG, because of the Title X status of USAR Soldiers, 
reservists are seldom utilized for domestic/HLS missions. The recently signed NDAA 
amended Chapter 1209 of Title 10, United States Code states the following. 
§ 12304a. Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air 
Force Reserve: order to active duty to provide assistance in response to a 
major disaster or emergency 
(a) AUTHORITY.—When a Governor requests Federal assistance in 
responding to a major disaster or emergency (as those terms are defined in 
section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122)), the Secretary of Defense may, without 
the consent of the member affected, order any unit, and any member not 
assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, of the Army Reserve, Navy 
Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air Force Reserve to active duty for 
a continuous period of not more than 120 days to respond to the 
Governor’s request.45  
This amendment makes Reservists located around the nation more accessible for 
domestic missions; however, their use still requires invocation of the Stafford Act. Even 
in a large emergency, like Hurricane Katrina, Governor Blanco was reluctant to ask for 
federal assistance, which caused a delay in federal assistance. For a state emergency 
confined within a state’s boundaries, the use of Army reservists is unlikely.  
                                                 
44 USAR, “Mission,” (n.d.), http://www.usar.army.mil/ourstory/Pages/default.aspx. 
45 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Section 515. 
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F. THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR 
The NG suffered a stigma during the Vietnam War when President Johnson made 
a conscious decision not to mobilize the reserves, but to rely on the draft instead.46 While 
8,700 NG troops were deployed to Vietnam,47 during this era of early-1960s to mid-
1970s, some joined the NG to avoid the Vietnam War, and most states actually had long 
waiting lists of potential recruits. George W. Bush served in the Texas and Alabama Air 
National Guard from 1968–1973; in fact, his critics claimed he was treated favorably 
because of his father’s political connections based on his aptitude scores and infrequent 
drill attendance.48 Guardsmen during this time were largely viewed as “weekend 
warriors,” and this negative stigma remained until the deployment of a large number of 
NG units for Desert Storm in 1991. The swift defeat of Iraqi forces in that war did much 
to bring the Army out of the post-Vietnam slump as it transitioned from a draftee to a 
volunteer force. For the first time since 1970, when the 42nd Infantry Division was 
mobilized to react to a postal workers strike in New York, ARNG soldiers began entering 
active duty on August 27, 1990. Ultimately, 62,411 Guardsmen in 398 units saw service 
in the Gulf War. Despite stories about units arriving unprepared for combat, 94% of the 
soldiers called were immediately available for overseas service.49  
The USAR has deployed 195k Soldiers in support of OIF and OEF since 9/11.50 
Since it contains specialty combat support units only available in the USAR, many units 
have been deployed extensively. Many units have also been broken up, deploying 
individuals to round out other units, and thousands of Individual Ready Reservists (IRR) 
have been mobilized to fill up deploying ARNG Brigades. Many Army Reservists have 
also been deployed for “non-standard” missions, or something other than the job for 
which they joined, such as security forces (SECFOR), and convoy security.  
                                                 
46 U.S. Military, “History of the Army National Guard,” (n.d.), 
http://usmilitary.about.com/od/guardandreserve/a/anghistory_4.htm. 
47 National Guard, “About the National Guard,” (n.d.), http://www.ng.mil/About/default.aspx. 
48 Lois Romano, “Bush's Guard Service In Question,” The Washington Post, February 3, 2004, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7372-2004Feb2.html.  
49 Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 307. 
50 Stultz, “2011 USAR Posture Statement.” 
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The ARNG has deployed 338,000 Soldiers in support of OIF and OEF since 
9/11.51 All the ARNG’s BCT’s and most other brigades have been mobilized at least 
once, and the ARNG has also been tapped for many company-sized, non-standard 
missions, such as SECFOR, detainee operations, quick reaction force (QRF), and base 
camp security. Many of the ARNG’s field artillery units have been mobilized as 
provincial MP units that require extensive pre-deployment training. Therefore, while 
deployments have provided increased funding and training to the ARNG and USAR, and 
transformed both from a Strategic Reserve to a fully Operational Reserve to the Army, 
these deployments do not come without a price.  
Since 2003, the ARNG has been fielded $23 billion of new equipment in an 
attempt to modernize the force and bring it up to speed with its active duty 
counterparts.52 A model called Army forces Generation Cycle (ARFORGEN) was 
developed in 2005 to develop a rotation of units to deploy for one year in a five-year 
cycle.53 The year following the deployment would consist of RESET, with three years 
devoted to individual and collective training, to deploy again. In reality, however, 
Soldiers in a deployment queue currently are constantly placed on and off orders during 
the 24 months prior to a deployment for training and new equipment fielding, which 
forces them to leave their families and employers for weeks or months at a time, before 
finally deploying for one year. Prior to 2007, ARNG units received 18-month 
mobilization orders to accomplish 3–5 months of pre-deployment training at a 
mobilization station, followed by 12 months boots-on-the ground (BOG), and 
demobilization.  
Deployments after 2007 have been limited to 12 months total to reduce the impact 
on Soldiers’ families and employers. However, to accommodate the pre-deployment 
training cycle, much of that training is now conducted pre-mobilization during home 
station training assemblies, and often includes extra training periods during the 24 
months prior to mobilization. It has also led to a shortened BOG time of 10 months or 
                                                 
51 2011 National Guard Posture Statement. 
52 Atlanta Journal Constitution, “Iraq War Drains Guard of Equipment.” 
53 AR 525-29, Army Force Generation, March 14, 2011. 
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less, and a subsequently, quicker rotation between units. As units enter the deployment 
lifecycle 24 months pre-mobilization, and often begin training on a non-standard mission, 
sometimes Soldiers do not train on their original MOS (military occupational skill) for 
three years or more, which has resulted in degraded MOS skills, especially in field 
artillery and other combat arms units. Following a year away, they are placed into a reset 
cycle and provided resources, such as counseling and veterans services, while 
simultaneously starting to train again for the next rotation in the deployment. As 
described above, this cycle has been accelerated by the reduced BOG time for 
predecessor units, and many ARNG units have deployed three or even four times since 
2003. Domestic response missions also occur during this five-year deployment lifecycle, 
and these missions generally utilize the same equipment and the same Soldiers. Most 
ARNG Soldiers have been deployed overseas twice and many have deployed three times 
since 9/11, and many spend at least 15 additional days a year on orders for domestic 
support operations. 
Figure 2 depicts numbers of reserve component Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Coast 
Guard, and Marines in total, and the numbers deployed since overseas since 9/11. 
Interestingly, almost every component has deployed nearly 100% of its force. Since 
2003, at least 90k Guardsmen and Reservists have been on active duty at any one time, 
and according to the JCS study on future use of the reserve component, the active 
component would have needed to be increased by 270k to meet these operational 
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Figure 1.   Reserve Component Assigned Strength55 
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Figure 2.   Reserve Component Numbers Deployed since 9/1156 
The long-term effects of this OPTEMPO on the NG remain to be seen. The 
extensive overseas deployments have resulted in diminished readiness for HLS missions, 
as noted in the RAND study of the Hurricane Katrina response.57 This report discusses 
regionalization of NG forces, and identification of HLS forces in the ARFORGEN model 
to ensure enough forces are left in CONUS for domestic response. Since many domestic 
operations involve the same equipment used in overseas deployments, the result of the 
longest war in U.S. history has been reduced readiness in NG units, particularly from an 
equipping standpoint. While the NG has met recruiting end strength goals since 2003, 
attrition has primarily occurred at the mid-level non-commissioned officer (NCO) and 
junior officer levels, of Soldiers with less than 10 years of service, and two or more 
                                                 
56 Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Reserve Affairs, “A Comprehensive Review of the Future Use of the Reserve Component,” 24. 
57 RAND Arroyo Center, “Hurricane Katrina Lessons for Army Planning and Operations,” 21. 
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deployments. Therefore, as the NG loses its experienced veterans, and replaces them with 
brand new Soldiers, quality of the overall force is reduced.  
G. DOMESTIC OPERATIONS AND THE NATIONAL GUARD 
In addition to the strains felt by the Reserve Component (RC) since 9/11 due to 
the high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) created by the GWOT, the NG has also been 
working hard to establish itself as the premier provider of domestic response forces. As 
seen by GEN McKinley’s priorities above, the vision for the NG is to be primarily a 
HLS/HLD force. The NG’s positioning across 3,300 communities makes it ideally suited 
as such. In response to Hurricane Katrina, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) established 
several initiatives to improve responses to domestic emergencies, manmade or natural. 
Each state was directed in 2005 by NGB to establish a joint staff responsible for 
coordinating Air and Army Guard responses to domestic emergencies. NGB created a 
Joint Staff at this time, and each state mirrored this organization in some fashion, with the 
Joint Staff focused on domestic operations in most states. Each state and territory also 
stood up a Civil Support Team (CST) that consists of 22 full-time Army and Air 
personnel capable of deploying within three hours and of identifying chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear agents. In addition, each state and territory has 
established a Joint Task Force (JTF) to provide command and control to military assets 
deployed in support of civil authorities, a National Guard Reaction Force (NGRF) to 
provide force protection and security for domestically deployed military forces. A 
CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiation, Nuclear-Explosive) Enhanced Response Force 
Package (CERFP) Command and Control Team has been established in each FEMA 
region to provide an immediate response capability to the governor with search and 
extraction, decontamination, medical, and command and control capabilities, and a 
Homeland Reaction Force (HRF) has been stood up in seven states to provide security for 
the CERFPs.58 NGR 500-1 defines three basic domestic support missions for the National 
Guard.59 
                                                 
58 National Guard, “The National Guard’s Role in Homeland Defense,” (n.d.), 
http://www.ng.mil/features/HomelandDefense/index.html. 
59 NGR 500-1, Domestic Operations, June 13, 2008. 
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National Guard domestic operations fall into three mission areas. 
(1) Homeland defense for which DoD serves as the primary federal agency 
and military forces are used to conduct military operations in defense of 
the homeland  
(2)  NG civil support for which the NG normally serves in a supporting role to 
other primary state or federal agencies by providing assistance to U.S. 
civil authorities at the federal, state, tribal, and local levels 
(3)  The NG baseline operating posture in which the NG conducts required 
planning, training, and exercises, as well as some ongoing mandated 
domestic operations 
Homeland defense is defined as “operations conducted in the air, land, maritime, 
and space domains and in the information environment,” for which DoD is the lead 
agency, and NG Soldiers and Airmen generally serve in a Title X capacity when 
conducting such operations. Some NG units have been specifically tasked for homeland 
defense missions, such as the anti-missile and air defense units assigned to the Alaska 
National Guard.  
NG civil support missions are defined by DoD as “Department of Defense support 
to civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and 
other activities.” This mission is further defined by NGB as “Support provided by the 
National Guard of the several states while in State Active Duty status or Title 32 duty 
status to civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement 
and other activities.” This support is almost always done in a state active duty, or Title 32 
status, but the President has the authority under the Insurrection Act to mobilize 
Guardsmen in a federal status. NG civil support missions are conducted for the following. 
(1)  Supporting civil authorities whose capabilities or capacity is insufficient to 
meet current requirements with general purpose, specialized, or unique 
Guard forces or capabilities 
(2)  Protecting the life, property, and safety of U.S. citizens and U.S. persons  
(3)  Protecting critical U.S. infrastructure  
(4)  Providing humanitarian assistance during disaster response and domestic 
emergencies  
(5)  Providing support to designated law enforcement activities and operations  
(6)  Providing support to designated events, programs, and other activities 
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Civil support missions also include disaster response and domestic emergency 
missions, which are also generally conducted in a state Active Duty or Title 32 status. 
The lead agency for these response missions is at the state/local level, with the NG in a 
supporting role, and states have the ability to request cross-border support from neighbor 
states using the Emergency Management Agreement Compact (EMAC) process. Some 
units like the CST are specifically designated for these types of missions, but generally 
units are tasked based on capabilities and location in relation to the disaster. In addition to 
the types of missions listed above, NG Soldiers and Airmen also support law enforcement 
activities under the counterdrug program, protection of critical infrastructure, and 
national special security events.  
The NG baseline operating posture is defined as day-to-day operations, involving 
training, planning and exercises, and maintaining situational awareness of the homeland 
security environment. The NG baseline operating posture is intended to do the following. 
(1)  Assist in deterring and preventing attacks on the U.S. homeland 
(2)  Maintain well-trained and well-equipped units prepared to conduct or 
support state or federal missions 
(3) Maintain situational awareness and detect threats or concerns 
(4)  Conduct mandated ongoing domestic operations, e.g., counterdrug 
operations 
As NGR 500-1 explains, the NG possesses unique capabilities for domestic 
operations. NGB has identified key units essential to every state to support state missions. 
Known as the “Essential 10” capabilities list, NGR 500-1 offers the following definition: 
“Governors count on National Guard assets to be available to them within the first hours 
of a domestic incident. To meet the Governors’ requirements, the CNGB established the 
following list of 10 essential capabilities for National Guard Domestic Operations.”60 
(1)  Aviation/Airlift  
(2)  Command and Control (C2)  
(3)  Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high-yield Explosives 
(CBRNE) response  
(4)  Engineering  
                                                 
60 National Guard Regulation 500-1, National Guard Domestic Operations, June 13, 2008, 7–16. 
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(5)  Medical  
(6)  Communications  
(7)  Transportation  
(8)  Security  
(9)  Logistics  
(10)  Maintenance 
H. SUMMARY 
The NG has an extensive history as a provider of forces for homeland security and 
homeland defense missions. Both the Army Reserve and the NG have extensively been 
involved in the GWOT since 9/11, transitioning from a Cold-War, strategic reserve to 
fully operational reserves in their own right. As the Army prepares to downsize as many 
as 90,000 Soldiers in a post-war environment, the reserve component will likely be relied 
upon even more heavily in the future. The world is an uncertain place, and DoD faces 
some extensive challenges in trying to balance the economic constraints the United States 
is currently facing with being adequately prepared for future threats. It has been said the 
pitfall of war planning is “always fighting the last war.” In continuing on a path to sustain 
11 carrier groups, and continue development of the F-35 fighter program, along with a 
commitment to increase the U.S. presence in the Pacific Rim, while cutting ground forces 
(Army and USMC), this administration does not seem to be overly focused on the 
counterinsurgency operations dominating DoD’s attention for the past 10 years. 
However, homeland defense, homeland security, and defense support to civil authorities 
for natural disasters are not expected to decline. These services are going to continue to 
be needed, and the NG is likely to continue to be their primary provider.  
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III. POLICY OPTIONS 
A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the 
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. 
–2nd Amendment, as ratified by Thomas Jefferson, 179161 
As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down, the Army will cut 90,000 troops 
from its authorized end-strength, and reduce it to 490,000 by 2014. The ARNG is 
programmed to remain at 350,200, with the USAR staying at 205,000, at least through 
2014. The Navy, Air Force, and USMC are also planning significant force reductions in 
their active components. The two-major contingency policy followed by DoD since the 
beginning of the Cold War is now being criticized as cost-prohibitive. Post Cold War 
troop reductions at overseas bases have been implemented in Europe, yet the current 
Presidential Administration has announced a renewed interest in maintaining a presence 
in the Pacific Rim. After reaching a high of 750,000 in 1985, the active Army was 
reduced to 480,000 by the late 1990s, and at 490,000, it will be back to pre-9/11 levels.62 
Thus, while the Army positions itself to a post-war posture, it will inevitably continue to 
include both its reserve components in contingency planning for future conflicts. As 
budgets and manning decrease, is it possible for the NG to maintain a dual-mission focus, 
and continue to be a fully operational reserve? As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan end, 
and the NG shifts focus to its DSCA mission, how can the NG best posture itself for 
success?  
A. MILITIA 
Much debate has ensued in this country about the right to bear arms, as prescribed 
by the 2nd amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently ruled the language in 
this amendment applies to all free citizens concerning gun ownership, yet fundamental is 
the language regarding the militia.  
                                                 
61 FindLaw, “2nd Amendment Bearing Arms,”(n.d.), 
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/amendment02/. 
62 infoplease.com, “Active Duty Military Personnel,” (n.d.), 
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In the Federalist Papers No 29, Alexander Hamilton writes that a “if a well-
regulated militia be the most natural defense of a free country, it ought certainly be under 
the regulation and at the disposal of that body which is constituted the guardian of 
national security.”63 He goes on to say “if standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an 
efficacious power over the militia, in the body to whose care the protection of the State is 
committed, ought, as far as possible, to take away the inducement and the pretext to such 
unfriendly institutions. If the federal government can command the aid of the militia in 
those emergencies which call for the military arm in support of the civil magistrate, it can 
the better dispense with the employment of a different kind of force.”64  
To understand the context of this discussion, and framing in the Constitution, it is 
important to consider the experience of this nation with British occupation. The 2nd 
amendment mentions a “well-regulated militia,”65 the 3rd amendment states “No Soldier 
shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without consent of the Owner,”66 and 
the 4th amendment prohibits search and seizure.67 These amendments are all attributable 
to the founding father’s aversion to a large standing army and use of the military to 
enforce the King’s rule from across the Atlantic. The 10th amendment specifically 
preserves states rights, also indicating a strong aversion to centralized control and 
tyranny. These provisions not only set the United States apart from all other countries in 
the world, they set the foundation for a strong, state-controlled militia (NG), not only to 
defend the nation against foreign invaders, but also as an economic necessity (since 
standing armies are costly), and as a mechanism to avoid tyranny. In other words, the 
modern NG was born and is key to the nation’s fundamentals. The Guard was 
deliberately incorporated into the fundamental architecture of the United States since its 
inception, with the dual-role mission it had already been doing for over 100 years prior to 
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64 Ibid. 
65 FindLaw, “2nd Amendment Bearing Arms,”(n.d.), 
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the nation’s founding. While other nations have reserve components to their military, the 
state/federal relationship of the NG is unique to the United States. A consequence of this 
relationship brings about the biggest strength of the NG, which is its political power. Ties 
to each state’s congressional delegation, and the council of 50 Governors and Adjutants 
General, combined with the lobbying power of NGAUS, make the NG a uniquely 
political-military organization, capable of effectively navigating between local, state, and 
federal missions, while adding a layer of national security, as well as a “military first-
responder in every zip code.”68  
B. SECURITY AMERICAN CAN AFFORD 
The United States spends approximately 20% of its annual budget on defense, 
nearly four times as much as the next leading competitor China, and more than the next 
20 competitors combined. This figure represents 4.06% of U.S. Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) in 2012, second only to Saudi Arabia that spends 10% of its GDP, and is a 
historically low figure, reaching 38% in 1944.69 However, many have called for 
decreased defense spending in light of current economic troubles, and billions of dollars 
spent from supplemental authorizations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which leads some to 
question the return from those expenditures.  
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Figure 3.   U.S. Federal Spending Fiscal Year 201070 
As outlined in an NGB posture statement, the NG provides a bargain to the U.S. 
taxpayer. “Security American Can Afford,” is described by NGB as follows.71 
 For 11% of the Army budget, the ARNG provides 32% of the Army’s 
total personnel and 40% of its operating forces  
 For 7% of the Air Force budget, the ANG provides 19% of the Air Force’s 
total personnel and 30–40% of the Air Force fighter, tanker and airlift 
capacity  
 An “as needed” force, the NGs community-based, part-time structure 
offers a myriad of savings (nearly 85% of NG is part-time) 
 Fewer pay days per year; lower medical costs 
 Lower retirement expenditures 
 Significantly lower training costs beyond initial qualification 
training 
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 Virtually no cost for moving families and household goods to new 
duty stations 
 Fewer entitlements, such as housing and food allowances 
 Lower base support costs in terms of services and facilities, such as 
housing and child care facilities  
 For the cost of one active duty service member, our nation can train, retain 
and deploy three NG Soldiers or Airmen 
 Much of the NGs dual-use equipment can be employed for federal and 
domestic missions  
 The ANG operates for less than two cents of every dollar spent on defense 
In fact, some have suggested as the defense budget gets trimmed, expensive, 
heavy type units like armor and artillery formations be moved into the NG to experience 
a reduced OPTEMPO expense. NG units operate the equipment less, thereby using less 
fuel and maintenance funds. Retired Air Force Chief of Staff, General Ron Fogelman has 
suggested the value of growing the reserve component, while drawing down the active 
duty forces as a way to maintain expandability for future operations while cutting costs in 
the near term.72  
C. STRATEGIC VS. OPERATIONAL RESERVE 
There has been much discussion in the industry about the reserve component 
transitioning from a Cold-War strategic reserve to an operational reserve. In 2007, the 
Army published a proposed definition of operational reserve. 
The total Reserve Component structure that operates across the continuum 
of military missions performing both strategic and operational roles in 
peacetime, wartime, contingency, domestic emergencies, and homeland 
defense operations. As such, the Services organize, resource, equip, train, 
and utilize their Guard and Reserve Components to support mission 
requirements to the same standards as their active components. Each 
Service's force generation plan prepares both units and individuals to 
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cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant 
commands, the Services, service members, their families, and civilian 
employers.73 
This is an extension of the Total Force Policy introduced by Secretary of Defense 
James Schlesinger in 1973, the same year the draft was abolished.74 After suffering a 
severe stigma when President Lyndon B. Johnson decided not to mobilize the reserve 
component for Vietnam, this policy ensured that the Army would never go to war without 
its reserves again. In addition to maintaining the same standards of training and readiness, 
reserve component units would now be programmed into active war plans. After a period 
of inactivity since the Korean War, more than 22K Soldiers from the ARNG and USAR 
were activated for Desert Storm in 1990.75 9/11 and the ensuing GWOT starting in 2003 
caused a use of the reserve component unlike anything since the Korean War. To date, 
more than 500K ARNG and USAR Soldiers have served in OIF or OEF, and at one point, 
half of the combat brigades in Iraq were from the ARNG.76 This transition to an 
operational reserve consisted of increased funding, equipment modernization, and 
training unlike anything experienced previously. No Soldier who joined the ARNG after 
9/11 has experienced the one weekend a month, two-week annual training model, as 63% 
of Guardsmen have deployed once, and 37% have deployed twice since 2003.77 As the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down, and budgets are reduced across DoD, the 
maintenance of two separate, fully operational reserves for the Army is unsustainable.  
The shift from strategic to operational reserve brought an increase in resources. 
New equipment expenditures between 2005–2010 reflect the most extensive 
modernization since World War II, yet equipping has now tapered off, and the 2011 
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budget is a mirror of 2010, with future budgets projected to be capped at 2009 levels. In a 
troubled economy, DoD is feeling the pressure of all federal agencies and planning to 
downsize and cut equipping programs.78 As the Army downsizes further, it is a logical 
conclusion that reliance on the NG will likely increase.  
D. FUTURE USE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENT 
A comprehensive review of the future role of the reserve component conducted by 
the Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs suggests the elimination of the term strategic 
and operational reserve, asserting the reserve component has become an integral part of 
the U.S. military. “During a decade of sustained engagement in combat operations, the 
Reserve Components of our Armed Forces have been transformed, both practically and 
philosophically, from a strategic force of last resort to an operational reserve that 
provides full-spectrum capability to the Nation.”79 The report recommends several 
changes, yet emphasizes areas in which the reserve component is particularly well suited, 
including operational rotations, theater security cooperation and partnership program 
activities, individual augmentees, units, teams, HLD and DSCA missions (which is 
specified in the report as specifically well suited for the NG), and for rotational training 
missions. The report reiterates the total force concept, and the Abrams policy, coined by 
GEN Creighton Abrams after Vietnam, who stated the Army would “never go to war 
without its reserves again.”80 The report also recommends “rebalancing” the total force in 
order to enhance capabilities, reduce stress, preserve readiness, and provide a level of 
predictability for deployments, with an emphasis on AC/RC integration.81 In short, the 
reserve component has become a critical part of national strategy and defense planning, 
and will be for the foreseeable future. Table 3 depicts potential missions identified by the 
report for the Reserve component.  
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Table 2.   Potential Role of the Reserve Component Across the Range of Military 
Operations82 
Naval War College professor and strategist Thomas Barnett proposes the idea of 
splitting the U.S. military into a “Leviathan” force capable of conducting rapid 
deployments, and extremely swift and violent military actions anywhere in the world, and 
a “sys-admin” force capable of following the initial invasion and conducting the difficult 
and lengthy stability operations to follow. His concept of the sys-admin force is an older, 
more mature force comprised of Citizen-Soldiers with expertise in necessary fields like 
civil affairs, public works, and law enforcement.83 In short, he describes the reserve 
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32.  
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component of the Army. Thousands of reserve component Soldiers have deployed to Iraq 
and Afghanistan to conduct such “sys-admin” missions. These types of nation-building 
missions are complex, and time-consuming, as witnessed in Iraq after a swift initial 
occupation of Baghdad, followed by a long period of rebuilding that is continuing even 
after the United States has left. Following Barnett’s logic, a larger sys-admin force, 
combined with a smaller Leviathin force, will not only conserve precious resources, but 
will ultimately lead to a more effective U.S. military, and ultimately, a more stable world. 
In an increasingly globalized economy, comprised of what Bobbitt describes as 
“market states” vs. “nation-states,”84 anti-terrorism/counterinsurgency/asymmetrical 
operations seem much more likely for the future of the U.S. Army than a large-scale, 
“near-peer” war with a state power, such as China or North Korea. This viewpoint further 
supports Barnett’s argument for a more stable world being achievable by shrinking the 
“gap” and expanding the “core,” with core states being economically connected stable 
countries, and the gap being those disconnected, failed or ineffective states that harbor 
terrorists, breed corruption, and deter investors and economic development. Since the gap 
countries produce most of the world’s terrorism, the theory is that shrinking this gap is 
the only way to win the long-term war on terror. As the United States struggles 
economically and is faced with the realities of decreased defense spending, it is essential 
to identify how to accomplish this new world order on the cheap. In short, today’s Army 
must gain efficiencies to cut costs, continue to do more with less, and prepare for an 
uncertain future, overseas and domestically. In any scenario, it will be unable to do so 
without its reserve component.  
While the GWOT has transformed the USAR and ARNG into fully operational 
reserve forces, the ARNG has also been very proactive in positioning itself to be the lead 
provider of Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA). The recent law enacted giving 
the Chief of NGB membership on the JCS will only strengthen the NG’s unique role as a 
kind of “military first responder.” The USAR, faced with decreased relevance, and 
imminent budget cuts, has also expressed interest in joining the “home game,” and 
                                                 
84 Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent (Anchor, 2009). 
 38
NDAA-2012 removed some of the roadblocks to the use of Title X reservists for 
domestic operations. However, the NG maintains its unique dual-status under control of 
the governors until federalized for active service in Title X. The flexibility Guardsmen 
have to be mobilized in State Active Duty (SAD), Title 32 (federal dollars under state 
control), or Title X (federal control) is something the USAR cannot match. In a postwar, 
reduced budget environment, the Army must seek to gain efficiencies with its reserve 
component. The NG cannot continue as an operational reserve, focus on domestic 
operations, and do so effectively with less resources and reduced manpower. The 
following policy options outline some possible solutions to this problem the NG is about 
to face.  
E. OPTION ONE 
The ARNG becomes primarily a HLS force focused on domestic missions. The 
NG has made great strides since 2003 to establish itself as the premier provider of HLS 
forces for domestic missions, manmade and natural. The NG has a long history of 
providing homeland defense since its inception as a militia force, and its unique state 
control during peacetime offers governors direct and expedient access to military forces. 
In this option, the ARNG would focus on domestic missions, and shift to a strategic 
reserve as it would still need to be able to deploy in support of a state actor conflict (Gulf 
War scenario) since the active Army will be too small to handle a large or multiple 
contingencies without the support of the ARNG. 
Since 2003, under the leadership of then Chief of NGB LTG Blum, NGB 
underwent several initiatives to improve NG readiness for domestic operations that was 
largely a response to lessons learned during Hurricane Katrina, during which more than 
55K Soldiers representing all 50 states were deployed to LA and MS.85 LTG Blum came 
to NGB from NORTHCOM, and was intimately aware of domestic preparedness 
shortcomings across the NG. He announced a plan in July 2003 to create a joint staff at 
NGB, and in each state, to synthesize the Army and Air staffs into one joint staff 
responsible for planning and preparing for Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) 
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missions. This plan would create efficiencies, and eliminate staff positions in the states.86 
However, the states all approached this in different ways, and in many states, a third joint 
staff was created in addition to the Army and Air staffs. In most states, the joint staff is 
focused on DSCA. 
In addition, each state and territory has established a Joint Task Force (JTF) to 
provide command and control to military assets deployed in support of civil authorities, a 
Civil Support Team (CST) for CBRNE detection and response, a NGRF to provide force 
protection and security for domestically deployed military forces, and a CBRNE 
Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) Command and Control Team has been 
established in each FEMA region to provide immediate response capability to the 
governor with search and extraction, decontamination, medical, and command and 
control capabilities.87 The CST and CERFP response teams, in particular, are uniquely 
NG, as they are non-deployable overseas, and can only be utilized in a Title 32 
capacity.88 
This option would involve the focus of the ARNG to shift from Title X war-
fighting capabilities to a focus on DSCA, in particular, the CBRNE expertise already 
residing in the NG, which would involve a fundamental shift away from the traditional 
train-equip-deploy model of the ARNG. While saying the ARNG should never be 
deployed overseas is unrealistic, a paradigm shift of the NG back to a Cold War, strategic 
reserve, with a renewed emphasis on domestic missions, is required. Otherwise, reduced 
funding will decrease readiness for both missions, and doing “more with less” is not 
sustainable indefinitely.  
The first necessary step is the creation of a truly joint, integrated staff in every 
state, focused on DSCA. The joint staff should consist of a single primary staff officer 
responsible for personnel (J1), intelligence (J2), operations (J3), logistics (J4), and (J5) 
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civil affairs, etc, responsible for planning and sourcing all federal and state missions for 
the Army and Air components. Each directorate would be staffed with Soldiers and 
Airmen working service-specific programs (Airmen working air operations, Soldiers 
working ground operations, etc.), gaining efficiencies by consolidating common 
functions (finance, personnel administration, and ground maintenance), and reduce 
overhead at the staff director level by consolidating from three staffs to one. In other 
words, instead of having an Army Colonel doing Army Operations (G3), an Air Colonel 
doing Air Operations (A3), and a third Colonel doing Joint Operations (J3), a joint staff 
directorate would be created with Soldiers and Airmen working under one “purple” 
(Army or Air) Colonel planning Army, Air, and state (HLD) missions. A consolidation of 
staff would be more in line with the Goldwater Nichols Act, which established DoD joint 
operations statutorily in 1986, and NG Soldiers and Airmen have been working together 
in theatre since the Gulf War.89  
The mobilization policy of the U.S. Army should also be revisited. FORSCOM 
Regulation 500-3-3 (FORMDEPS), has not been updated since 1999. The five levels of 
mobilization shown below should be revised under this option to specify use of the NG 
only during a full mobilization, or total mobilization scenario. In short, the NG would 
become a strategic reserve, while maintaining the USAR as an operational reserve, to be 
utilized more frequently using the partial mobilization criteria defined below.90  
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Table 3.   The Mobilization Spectrum91 
While the ARNG will always be a necessary part of the total force as a reserve to 
the Army in case of future conflicts, this option would transition the NG from an 
operational reserve back to a Cold-War strategic reserve. Faced with diminished budgets, 
and future manpower cuts, the NG must choose a single focus; It can do DSCA well, or 
continue to try and do federal and state missions poorly. Readiness costs money, and in a 
post-war environment, money must be conserved.  
                                                 
91 FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-3, Volume III, Reserve Component Unit Commander’s Handbook, 
March 31, 1998, 31–32.  
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Implications are many, ranging from a shift of training focus, to modification of 
the ARFORGEN model. ARNG units should not be included in contingency plans, or 
programmed for deployment in an AFORGEN cycle, or the model should be spread out 
to allow for a more substantial number of NG forces to remain at home for domestic use. 
In other words, rather than being programmed for a deployment once in a five-year cycle, 
NG units should be spread to one in seven or eight years, with specific “Essential 10 
capabilities” (as described above) units left out of the model altogether, giving governors 
peace of mind knowing their most used units will not be deployed overseas when they are 
needed domestically.  
1. Advantages 
This option is the closest to status quo; it requires the least amount of change from 
the Army’s current structure, so will therefore be the most politically palatable. As 
funding is cut, the ARNG will naturally experience diminished readiness, and 
maintenance as an operational reserve will naturally become infeasible. The current 
ARFORGEN model will become less important as the United States transitions military 
forces out of Afghanistan. The current 12-month deployment policy will need to be 
reviewed as readiness declines, and future call-ups will likely require more substantial 
train-up time, new equipment, and funding to do so. Future conflicts are not likely to be 
against a nation-state threat, but rather a failed state, or terrorist threat, which will likely 
be handled by active duty special forces (SF) units, and the “sys-admin” forces of the 
reserve component described by Barnett will likely have time for significant amounts of 
train-up pre-deployment.  
2. Disadvantages 
This option does not come without risk by Army and ARNG leadership. Since 
World War II, the Army has employed a Total-Force policy that includes the ARNG in 
war plans, alignment of ARNG units with active duty brigades, assigning designated 
mobilization stations, and focused training for standard missions. This option would 
require a fundamental paradigm shift in the train-equip-deploy cycle the ARNG has used 
for the past 60 years. The transition to an operational reserve came with many benefits, 
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such as increased funding, equipment modernization, and the current 12-month 
mobilizations/pre-mobilization training model generally seen as NG victories. A shift 
back to a less ready, Cold-War strategic reserve will likely not be viewed favorably by 
NG leadership, which has made great strides toward increased NG relevance. More 
importantly, the world is an uncertain place. Can America really afford to have a smaller 
active military and a less ready NG? 
3. Probability of Success 
The NG has successfully maintained a dual-role mission set since its inception. 
There is no reason to believe it cannot do so today. Yet decreased funding will result in 
decreased readiness, and something will have to give. Valuable training time must be 
focused, and while preparing for federal and state missions is not diametrically opposed, 
they are different, and depending on the type of unit, sometimes quite different. While 
this option would allow the NG to focus on domestic missions and only be used for 
federal mobilizations in dire occasions, it may not be possible with an already thinly 
stretched and downsizing Army.  
The use of the National Guard with its present powerful armament is not 
generally suitable for the execution of state missions…. and not consistent 
with sound public policy” and that “the same forces can no longer be 
expected to perform both local and national function and that a modern 
Federal striking force cannot be prepared adequately under state control. 
–The Gray Board Report, June 194892 
F. OPTION TWO 
The NG focuses on becoming the premier HLS force, while remaining an 
operational reserve to the Army and Air Force. As the Army downsizes, some are calling 
to move heavy units (armor and artillery) to the reserve component as a cost-savings 
measure; since OPTEMPO is lower, these expensive units would be cheaper to maintain. 
This option would require a reversal of the off-site agreement of 1994 that left all combat 
arms units in the ARNG, and the Army Reserve with Combat Support (CS) and Combat 
                                                 
92 Buchalter, “Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components,” 2. 
 44
Service Support (CSS) units.93 For the ARNG to focus on HLS, this option would move 
combat arms units into the USAR as a strategic reserve to the Army, and CS and CSS 
units into the ARNG to serve primarily as a HLS force for the governors, and secondarily 
as a strategic reserve to the Army.  
A review conducted in 1994 resulted in a restructuring of the ARNG and Army 
Reserve. In a post-cold war environment, the ARNG would consist of combat arms, and 
the USAR of CS and CSS. In 1996, the USAR was affirmed as a separate command of 
the Army, and in 1997, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) addressed the need to 
create enhanced separate ARNG brigades, as recommended by the 1994 review.94 This is 
the current arrangement with which the Army went to war in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
However, due to the nature of those contingencies, (quickly transitioning to 
counterinsurgency following the initial invasions), many combat brigades of the ARNG 
were deployed for non-standard missions like convoy security, detainee operations, and 
security forces. In short, there were not enough MP units to meet the requirements. Thus, 
combat arms units, such as field artillery, were largely retrained for other types of 
security missions that resulted in large inefficiencies, in which equipment was fielded for 
a doctrinal mission (artillery), then parked while the unit deployed to do a different type 
of mission altogether. This also caused additional strain on individual Soldiers who were 
required to complete their MOS training for the job they joined to do, then spend many 
more weeks on additional orders pre-deployment to be cross trained for a security 
mission, then deploy for the non-standard mission, only to return and be required to 
complete additional leadership and MOS skill training to remain proficient and be 
eligible for promotion within their duty assignment.  
A hazard of utilizing lessons learned from recent conflicts for future planning is 
“fighting the last war.” If it is assumed that future conflicts will also involve 
counterinsurgency operations, and not require heavy combat formations, the tendency 
might be to reduce the number of combat arms units across the Army. A future conflict 
with a state-actor, such as North Korea or China, while seemingly unlikely, would prove 
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that decision to be short sighted. However, aside from that discussion, which requires 
some future predictions, the optimal mix of force structure should be reviewed. Another 
review like the one conducted after the Gulf War is in order. What is the optimal 
structure of the ARNG, Army Reserve, and active Army? 
In this option, the 1994 agreement would be reversed, with combat arms units 
going to the USAR, and the CS and CSS units of the USAR moving to the ARNG that 
would leave the USAR as a strategic reserve to the Army, with heavy armor and artillery 
formations, and combat brigades becoming reserve assets to be used in the event of future 
conflicts. In this option, the ARNG would keep all its non-combat arms type of units 
(Engineer, Aviation, etc.), and transfer all combat arms (artillery, armor, and infantry) 
units to the USAR. The USAR would transfer all of its current force structure to the NG 
of whatever state in which its units reside. The units currently residing in the USAR are 
all units on NGB’s “Essential 10” capabilities list described above, and therefore, would 
increase each state’s capability to respond to natural and man-made disasters. This plan 
would allow the ARNG to focus on the DSCA mission, and the USAR to become the 
primary reserve to the Army, with the understanding that the support units of the ARNG 
would still be available for overseas deployment in the event of future conflicts.  
In this option, both reserve components would remain operational reserves to the 
Army, but with very different mission capabilities. The USAR would be available to 
provide a “punch” to the “Leviathan” force as needed for rapid, violent deployment to 
trouble spots, while the NG, heavily engaged in DSCA operations domestically, would be 
able to provide “sys-admin” forces to provide security, civil affairs, and nation-building 
type capabilities to the ensuing peacekeeping/stability/operations other than war.  
1. Advantages 
This option provides maximum flexibility to the Army by optimizing the force 
structure mix between the ARNG and USAR by moving the CS and CSS units from the 
USAR to the ARNG for domestic support missions, and leaving a reserve combat force 
in the Title X USAR, as well as maintain ARNG combat support forces for federal 
deployment as needed. In fact, every type of unit possessed by the USAR is on NGB’s 
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“Essential 10 capabilities” list. This option would maintain a separate federal (Title X) 
reserve to the Army, which is directly accessible by the Chief of Staff without State 
control, and would leave the ARNG to focus on DSCA missions. It would create a tiered 
approach to mobilization, with the USAR focused on the war-fight, and the ARNG 
focused on domestic operations, and the nation-building missions required post-invasion.  
2. Disadvantages 
This option, while increasing NG capabilities for the DSCA mission, may not be 
popular among ARNG commanders, who traditionally have not been interested in the 
support role of USAR units. This resistance has been evidenced by the reluctant 
deployment of combat arms units to conduct non-standard (security) missions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. It may not be popular with USAR leadership either, who have had a combat 
support role since the inception of the USAR. This option also continues the inefficiency 
of maintaining two separate reserve components, which is economically troubling in light 
of today’s budget environment. It creates a significant amount of turbulence by 
transferring units between the ARNG and USAR. Soldiers may be faced with switching 
units, cross training into a new MOS, or switching service components, all of which incur 
associated costs, and possible retention issues.  
3. Probability of Success 
This option will greatly increase the NG’s ability to perform its DSCA mission by 
increasing the types of support units needed for those missions. It will also maintain a 
dedicated reserve component for federal missions, which will be necessary as the active 
Army downsizes. While it involves a significant amount of turbulence, and will likely 
experience resistance initially, it provides maximum flexibility to the Army.  
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Every man therefore that wishes to secure his own Freedom, and thinks it 
his Duty to defend that of his Country, should, as he prides himself in 
being a Free Citizen, think it his Truest Honour to be a Soldier Citizen. 
–Exercise for the Militia of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay, 
Boston, 175895  
G. OPTION THREE 
The NG focuses on becoming the premier HLS force, while also maintaining 
itself as a fully operational reserve, subsuming the USAR, and maintaining a high state of 
readiness for both state and federal missions. The NG since 2003 has been actively 
reorganizing to become the premier provider of HLS forces. Due to its unique state-
control during peacetime, its positioning around the country in nearly every community, 
and a long history of first response, the NG is uniquely suited for this domestic mission. 
Since 9/11 and the GWOT, the NG has deployed more forces overseas than at any time 
since WWII. As a result of this high OPTEMPO, the NG has been funded, equipped, and 
trained better than at any time in its long history. This option would continue that high 
state of readiness for federal missions as a fully operational partner to the active Army 
and Air Force, while simultaneously achieving the lead role in homeland 
security/domestic response missions.  
In this option, the ARNG and USAR merge into a single reserve component. This 
idea has been suggested before; primarily in 1947 by the Gray Board, convened by 
Secretary of Defense James Forrestal. The Gray Board recommended merging the ARNG 
and USAR into a federal controlled force called the “National Guard of the United 
States.” However, Secretary Forrestal did not endorse the recommendation, and it 
experienced intense criticism from the National Guard and the National Guard 
Association (NGAUS). Then, in 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara proposed 
a plan to merge all reserve components of the Army under the management of the NG, or 
just the opposite of the Gray Board’s recommendation. This plan also came under heavy 
fire from the Reserve Officers Association (ROA), and was rejected by Congress.96 In 
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addition, a report authored by five retired general officers (three ANG, and two USAFR), 
in 2011 recommended the creation of a unified Air Reserve component, by merging the 
ANG and the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC).97 This proposal was also not 
implemented by the Air Force, despite the proposal’s assertion that it would save billions 
of dollars after implementation.98 In fact, a 1997 report from the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) estimated a $500 million annual savings from a merger of the Guard and 
Reserves.99 This option would recommend placing all units of the USAR under ARNG 
control, and effectively eliminating the USAR, subsuming all USAR units into the 
ARNG of the states to which they are assigned, and reducing overhead by placing 
administrative control to the TAG’s and JFHQ of the gaining states.  
While this idea is not new, and has always met fierce resistance, today’s fiscal and 
political environment provides an opportunity to renew the argument. In reality, a merger 
would consist of the integration of all the USAR force structure into the ARNG of the 
state in which it resides. The similarities between these two reserve components of the 
Army are so many that most outside observers do not know the difference. Both are 
trained, equipped, and organized the same way, and each force consists of citizen-
soldiers, employed full-time across all walks of life, and training periodically (typically 
one weekend/month and two weeks/year). The only real difference is the authority 
creating the two forces. USAR Soldiers serve on Title X under federal control at all 
times, unlike NG Soldiers and Airmen who serve their governors in Title 32 status until 
mobilized for federal missions. Therefore, USAR Soldiers, many of whom reside in the 
same communities as ARNG Soldiers, normally are not mobilized for domestic missions 
like disaster response, unless called upon for a national emergency by the President. 
Conversely, NG Soldiers and Airmen have the flexibility of being employed by their 
respective governors in a SAD or Title 32 status for local emergencies, or can be 
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federalized for Title X service. The combination of these forces would increase the 
number of military responders available for domestic missions by 70 percent. In fact, 
after the initial turbulence, (which would be substantial), the efficiencies created by 
merging these forces would result in cost savings for the taxpayer, and greatly enhance 
U.S. ability to respond to domestic emergencies, manmade or natural.  
This proposal is obviously detrimental to the USAR. As with the NG, the role of 
the USAR has been greatly enhanced since transitioning to an operational reserve after 
9/11. The USAR consists of 205,281 soldiers located in 1,100 reserve centers around the 
nation, with 15,584 Army Reservists currently deployed around the world, and 196,711 
soldiers deployed since 9/11.100 The core competency of the USAR is providing support 
units to the Army for federal mobilization, and its units include theatre support, civil 
affairs, engineering, training divisions, and chemical and biological detection companies, 
and it contains more than 2/3 of the Army’s medical brigades, civil affair units, dental 
units, combat support hospitals, and nearly one-half of the Army’s MP, medical and 
supply units.101 Many of these types of support units are considered critical dual use 
(CDU) units identified by NGB as essential to every state to support state missions, and 
every one of NGB’s “Essential 10” capabilities, as defined above, resides in the 
USAR.102  
This option benefits the ARNG greatly. Force structure brings resources, and the 
ARNG would stand to increase its presence in every state, and by as many as 18,611 
soldiers in Texas.103 The ARNG would presumably absorb the USAR’s budget ($8.1 
Billion in 2011), and take control of its six installations and 1,100 reserve centers. In 
addition, the ARNG would either consolidate or be the beneficiary of 16 operational 
commands, and six training commands commanded by two-star generals. The USAR has 
struggled to maintain relevance since the elevation of the Chief of NGB to a four-star 
general three years ago, and the recently signed National Defense Authorization Act 
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(NDAA) that gave the CNGB full membership of the JCS, while the USAR remains 
subordinate to the Army Chief of Staff. The USAR has reorganized several times since 
9/11 to reduce “overhead,” and has been reduced to nine support, and six training 
commands,104 while the NG consists of 54 state adjutant generals, fully supported and 
resourced by 54 governor and Congressional delegations from each state and territory. 
The Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve (OCAR), commanded by a 3-star general, 
and consisting of five general officer positions, and eight regional support commands, 
commanded by a two-star general, would be rendered obsolete as peacetime HQ whose 
functions would be assumed by the Joint Forces HQ in the gaining states. By reducing the 
overhead of administrative headquarters, efficiencies will be gained that will ultimately 
provide cost savings.  
1. Advantages 
This option would create efficiencies by maintaining one reserve component for 
the Army. The effects would be to increase the number of Citizen-Soldiers available for 
DSCA from 350K to nearly 600K, a 70% increase without associated costs. In fact, an 
ultimate cost savings will be achieved which are estimated to be as much as $500 million 
annually.105 All these forces and equipment would then be available to the governors for 
natural disasters and domestic response. The efficiencies and economies of scale gained 
would offset proposed budget cuts, enabling the ARNG to continue to function as an 
operational reserve, fully supporting the Army for its federal mission as well. Future 
deployments would now be wholly sourced by NGB in support of the combatant 
commander.  
2. Disadvantages 
This idea has been proposed several times before, and because it is so politically 
charged, it has never been implemented. It is likely to receive severe criticism from not 
only USAR leadership, but also from the Army leadership, and the ROA.  
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3. Probability of Success 
If implemented, this solution could result in increased readiness for domestic and 
federal missions, make a move in the direction of unity of command, and potentially save 
millions of dollars currently being spent duplicating efforts across two nearly identical 
reserve components. As the USAR continues to struggle for relevance, and the lines 
between Title 32 and Title X accessibility become blurred, there is less of a need to 
maintain two separate components than ever before.  
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. SUMMARY OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Option One retains the ARNG and USAR as reserve components to the Army, 
while shifting focus of the ARNG to domestic operations. Option Two also maintains a 
separate ARNG and USAR, but switches force structure between them to optimize the 
ARNG’s effectiveness for DSCA. Option Three involves absorption of the USAR into 
the ARNG, increasing its size by 70%, and making the 220K Soldiers of the USAR 
available for domestic operations as National Guardsmen. This chapter discusses the 
criteria used to evaluate these solutions.  
 




Option one: Cold War DSCA-focusFederal focus No Yes 
Option two: Two-Split DSCA focus Federal Focus Yes Yes 
Option three: GWOT Dual-Focus N/A Yes No 
Table 4.   Summary of Proposed Solutions 
We have to fund the operations we’re in. We have to make sure we 
resource our people. And then, obviously, we’ve got to get it right in both 
the equipment and systems that they need, both now and in the future. So I 
think what Secretary Gates is undertaking is critically important. I’ve said 
it several times publicly: I think the biggest threat we have to our national 
security is our debt. 
–Admiral Mike Mullen, in a “Tribute to the Troops” Speech June 2010106 
B. DESCRIPTION OF EVALUATION CRITERIA 
1. Funding 
In light of current U.S. economic troubles, and a reduced DoD budget highlighted 
by a reduction of the Army by 90K personnel, the most important criteria in evaluating 
the above described policy options is funding. While the ARNG is not programmed for 
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manpower reductions in 2012, the budget has already been frozen to 2010 levels, the 
ANG budget has been severely cut, and further cuts are expected. Therefore the Guard, 
like all other DoD entities, will continue to be expected to do more with less. As the 
NG’s focus shifts from overseas to domestic missions, the Guard must be able to operate 
more efficiently and cost effectively. While the extensive deployments experienced by 
the reserve component since 2003 have in some ways been a distracter from the HLS 
mission, they also brought to bear many resources that will now dwindle. These 
deployments also pushed the ARNG and USAR from a supporting role into a fully 
operational partner with the active component, to the extent the latest JCS study 
recommended deleting the terms “strategic reserve” and “operational reserve” from the 
vernacular. As the active military downsizes and funding is cut, the NG must decide how 
best to “trim the fat,” and refocus itself as the primary provider of DSCA forces.  
Of the above options, the first option is initially the least costly. Since it 
essentially describes a status quo scenario, in which the ARNG and USAR are 
maintained as separate reserve components of the Army, and as funding is cut, they both 
gradually shift from a fully engaged, operational partner in the GWOT to more of a Cold-
War, strategic reserve. This term seems to be somewhat pejorative, and will likely not be 
used by Army leadership, who has paid lots of lip service to the “total-force” concept 
since the concept was first introduced. The reality, however, is operationalizing the 
reserve component costs money. The levels of force modernization that have occurred 
within the RC since 2003 have been the most extensive since World War II, and the 
systems purchased with GWOT funds will need to be maintained. Current readiness 
levels cannot be maintained with decreased funding. In short, maintaining the status quo 
of two operational reserves while cutting costs is not a realistic option. 
The second option, of shifting force structure between the ARNG and USAR to 
optimize the HLS/HLD capabilities of the ARNG, while maintaining the USAR as a 
“federal reserve,” focused on the Title X “war-fighting” mission, is the most costly. Since 
this option still requires maintenance of two separate reserve components, readiness will 
decline as OPTEMPO budgets are reduced. As General Fogelman and others have 
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suggested,107 moving expensive heavy units from the active component to the reserves 
may reduce overall OPTEMP costs within the Army, but will greatly increase costs 
within the USAR and will require reallocation of OPTEMPO dollars between 
components. In turn, the HLD capabilities of the ARNG, which will be left to compete 
with the USAR for precious resources, will be negatively affected. In addition, the initial 
turbulence created by moving units between the ARNG and USAR will create initial 
costs that must be borne by the Army. Associated costs will come from Soldier cross 
training/reclassification, transportation of equipment, redesignation of units, and facility 
modification.  
Option three, combining the USAR and ARNG into one reserve component, 
capable of performing in state active duty, Title 32, or Title X, will result in the most 
cost-effective option in the long term. While this option is politically charged, and will 
initially cause significant amounts of turbulence, efficiencies gained will eventually result 
in cost savings, as much as $500 million annually.108 While this option has been 
seriously discussed twice before, both initiatives were defeated by Congress, in large part 
due to pressure from lobbying groups like NGAUS and the ROA.109 However, in light of 
today’s fiscal constraints, innovative and unpopular decisions must be considered. Some 
have gone so far as to suggest a move back to pre-1947, and making the U.S. Air Force 
part of the Army again as a cost-savings/efficiency gaining measure.110  
The U.S. deficit is of huge concern to policymakers at all levels, and as former 
Chairman of the JCS Admiral Mullen stated, is also a security issue. The implications of 
a potential adversary (China) holding so much U.S. debt are not fully understood, and is a 
topic for another discussion. However, the policy implications from a HLS perspective  
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are that cost-savings must be found. It is absolutely necessary to find innovative ways to 
secure the homeland without the benefit of unlimited funding, supplemental 
appropriations, and two wars to fuel the defense budget.  
Readiness levels will continue to suffer as long as we stay the current 
course with U.S. troops bogged down in an intractable civil war in Iraq. 
Deterioration in readiness levels already constrains our ability to deal with 
the escalating conflict in Afghanistan, much less potential crises in North 
Korea and Iran.”  
–Letter from Senators Pelosi and Reid to President Bush,  
November 2006111  
2. Readiness 
Readiness is defined by Joint Publication 1-02 as “The ability of U.S. military 
forces to fight and meet the demands of the National Military Strategy. Readiness is the 
synthesis of two distinct, but interrelated levels, unit readiness and joint readiness. Unit 
readiness is the ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to 
execute their assigned missions, which is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver 
the outputs for which it was designed. Joint readiness is the combatant commander’s 
ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute their 
assigned missions.”112  
AR 220-1 describes four measured areas that comprise a unit’s overall (C) rating: 
Personnel (P), equipment and supplies on-hand (S), equipment readiness/serviceability 
(R), and unit training level proficiency (T). The unit’s overall rating (1–4) cannot be 
higher than the lowest rating of the four measured areas; in other words, a unit with 
personnel or equipment shortages cannot be fully mission capable. Training is a 
subjective rating, measured by the commander’s perceived ability to accomplish the 
assigned mission, based on the status of the other measured areas. In other words, a unit 
cannot effectively train with severe personnel or equipment shortages.113  
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All Army units, ARNG, USAR and active, report at least quarterly on their 
readiness, and previously their reported readiness levels were used to source units for 
deployment. In 2007, the Army adopted a sourcing/resourcing model called Army Forces 
Generation Model (ARFORGEN), in which units are “rack and stacked” into a 
deployment model, one year in five for ARNG, one in four for USAR, and one in three 
for active duty units.114 This model assumes the highest levels of readiness in the final 
“ready” year, and increased readiness in the years leading up to the ready year, with 
readiness tapering off following a ready year, whether the unit actually deployed or not. 
Accordingly, resources are decreased in the years following a deployment, and the focus 
is on individual Soldier training, with collective unit training occurring in years three to 
four, prior to the available year. The model is subject to be compressed based on the 
requirements of the combatant commander, resulting in reduced dwell time between 
deployments, a term called “WARFORGEN” by then First U.S. Army Commander LTG 
Russell Honore.115 Also, the model does not currently account for domestic missions, of 
particular concern to the NG, although discussion has occurred about shaping 
ARFORGEN to ensure sufficient ARNG units remain home for their governor’s use for 
DSCA missions.116  
After nearly ten years of combat, readiness across the ARNG and USAR has been 
diminished. Equipment has spent several years in combat theatres, and rotated between 
units and experiencing harsh climates in Iraq and Afghanistan. Maintenance is a constant 
challenge while deployed, and rolling stock (wheeled vehicles), typically spend three to 
four years in theatre before being rotated home for reset. While personnel strength has 
been maintained across the ARNG, attrition rates exceed NGB’s goal of 15% in most 
states.117 Manning and equipping readiness rates for units are expected to be lower in 
reset years, which means conduct of its assigned mission will be largely degraded.118 
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Multiple deployments have taken a toll on Soldiers, their families, and their employers, 
and mid-level NCO’s and junior officers are leaving the force in large numbers. The 
amount of time and funds required to train a replacement Soldier or Airmen signals an 
alarming trend, and tougher to measure is the experience lost when a seasoned veteran 
leaves the force. Therefore, while recruiting goals continue to be met in a tough 
economy, personnel readiness has suffered. As 90K Soldiers depart the active Army, the 
ARNG and USAR can expect to pick up many seasoned, experienced Soldiers. However, 
many Soldiers who are also weary from nearly ten years of even more frequent 
deployments may steer clear of the reserve component as well, as they have seen ARNG 
and USAR Soldiers deployed alongside them since 2003.  
Readiness will be a challenge in light of diminishing budgets. War has been good 
for business, and a decreased federal mission will have the secondary negative effect of 
reducing the NG’s domestic preparedness. Option one will have the effect of decreased 
readiness in the ARNG and USAR. As resources dry up, both components will gradually 
fade back to a strategic reserve, regardless of terminology, domestic preparedness will be 
reduced, and both services will require more train-up time to deploy. Option three will 
reduce the inefficiencies of maintaining two separate reserve components, ultimately 
realizing cost savings, which could be used for increased readiness. However, cost 
cutting will be seen as a necessity, rather than an accomplishment, and any saved 
resources will likely not be available to invest in increased resources. Therefore, option 
two offers the best chance at increasing current readiness by providing a separate focus 
for the ARNG and USAR, with the Guard focused domestically, and the Reserves 
focused overseas.  
The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 515) that would amend 
chapter 1209 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize the Secretary of 
Defense, without the consent of the member affected, to order any unit, 
and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, of the 







Reserve to active duty for a continuous period of not more than 120 days 
in response to a Governor’s request for Federal assistance in responding to 
a major disaster or emergency. 
–NDAA 2012119 
3. Accessibility 
Much discussion has occurred about accessibility of the reserve component for 
domestic missions. In the past, the five Title X reserve components (Army, Navy, Air 
Force, Marine, and Coast Guard Reserve) have been seldom used for DSCA missions 
domestically. The 2012 NDAA contained the language above, which did make the 
reserves more accessible to a governor for a declared emergency. However, use of the 
reserves in a state still requires asking for federal assistance and use of the Stafford Act to 
mobilize Title X (federal) troops. Therefore, while the reserves are more accessible now, 
they are still to be used as a “last-resort,” since NG forces can be called to SAD without 
asking for federal assistance, or mobilized under Title 32 using federal funds but 
remaining under state control.  
NORTHCOM has made great strides with the dual-status commander program, in 
which general officers from the NG receive training and certification to be designated as 
dual-status commanders, with authority to command both Title X and Title 32 forces. A 
dual-status commander is an intermediary between two distinct chains of command; one 
from the governor and adjutant general, exercising command and control (C2) over NG 
forces from the supporting state (s), and also from the President, through the Secretary of 
Defense and the supported Combatant Commander (NORTHCOM), who exercises C2 
over Title X forces. The memorandum of agreement (MOA) signed by 51 governors and 
the SECDEF identified four options for designating a dual-status commander for a 
specific event or incident.120 
                                                 
119 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 621–622. 
120 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “Draft Issue Paper: Use of Dual-Status 
Commanders in Multi-State Incidents,” April 4, 2012, 
http://policy.defense.gov/hdasa/conferences/docs/OSD_Issue_Paper_DSC_Multi-Incidents_040412.pdf. 
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 Option #1: The governors of all affected states and the Secretary of 
Defense agree it is necessary and proper to designate a dual-status 
commander for each affected state (to date, this has never happened). 
 Option #2: The governors of all affected states and the Secretary of 
Defense agree it is necessary and proper to designate a single dual-status 
commander for all of the affected states (that was the case for the 
November 2004–January 2005 Operation Winter Freeze, which involved a 
New York National Guard dual-status commander for the states of New 
Hampshire, New York, and Vermont). 
 Option #3: The governors of some of the affected states and the Secretary 
of Defense agree it is necessary and proper to designate a dual-status 
commander for their states (that was the case for the response to Hurricane 
Irene in August 2011). 
 Option #4: The governors of the affected states and the Secretary of 
Defense agree it is not necessary and proper to designate any dual-status 
commanders or do not agree it is necessary and proper to designate any 
dual-status commanders (to date, that has never happened). 
While this MOA was a positive step for DSCA mission within the CONUS, it is 
being used exclusively for NG officers. Thus, while designated dual-status commanders 
can command NG, USAR, and active forces, the inverse is not true; USAR officers 
cannot command Title 32 forces, and never command Air personnel. Since USAR 
Soldiers always serve in a Title X status, this situation is not likely to change. 
Of the three proposed options, option three provides complete access to the 
USAR by subsuming it into the ARNG. This option, as described above, would place all 
200K Soldiers of the USAR into a Title 32 status, which would increase the number of 
Soldiers available for DSCA missions by 70 percent. The other two options both maintain 
the USAR as a separate federal reserve, which is accessible to governors in accordance 
with the 2012 NDAA, but require a request for federal assistance.  
The citizen soldier’s time has come 
–Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.)121 
                                                 




4. Political Will 
The reserve component, and especially the NG, has long enjoyed the political 
benefits of its close relationship to the governors of the 54 states and territories, and to its 
states’ congressional delegations. President Johnson’s decision not to mobilize the NG 
for Vietnam created a huge stigma for the Guard that took years to overcome, and 
prompted the total force concept of fully integrating the reserve component into the 
national defense structure. The success of the NG and Reserves in the two most recent 
wars is due largely to policy, and any plan to marginalize, downsize, or drastically 
restructure the reserve component is likely to meet strong resistance from the governors 
and TAGs. Additionally, lobbying groups like the National Guard Association of the 
United States (NGAUS), the Reserve Officers Association (ROA), have been 
tremendously effective at shaping legislation affecting the NG and Reserves. Political 
will then is defined as popularity, and in this case, will be measured in terms of 
popularity at the state governor/Congressional delegation level, since the NG has the 
largest political support base of any of the three components of the Army.  
The issues of accessibility, readiness, and the best use of the NG have been 
politically divisive. The NDAA signed by President Bush in 2007, which repealed the 
need for governor approval for federal mobilization of NG forces, was repealed in 2009 
after the National Governors Association sent a letter of petition.122 NORTHCOM has 
realized the value of collaboration with the NG, and the dual-status commander program 
was rolled out only after being approved by the Council of Governors.123 The 2012 
NDAA contained legislation placing the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) on 
the JCS. Despite being opposed by all four service chiefs, and the Secretary of Defense, 
this legislation was signed into law by President Obama in December 2011.  
In fact, state control of the militia, especially when used in a domestic capacity, is 
a time-honored value of the United States since the NG’s inception in 1636. States’ rights 
                                                 
122 National Governors Association, “Insurrection Letter to President Bush,” July 10, 2008, 
http://www.nga.org/cms/home/federal-relations/nga-letters/archived-letters--2008/col2-content/main-
content-list/title_july-10-2008-l.html. 
123 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “Draft Issue Paper: Use of Dual-Status 
Commanders in Multi-State Incidents.” 
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and an aversion to a large standing Army based on their experience with British 
occupation was so important to the founding fathers as to be included in the Constitution 
(2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 10th amendments), and in the Federalist Papers 29.  
Due to this history, and recent legislation giving the NG more power nationally, 
while also preserving the authority of governors to control their NG forces, political will 
in this context is defined as the likelihood of support from the Council of Governors, 
TAG’s, and Congressional delegates. While the USAR has been actively trying to enter 
the DSCA environment, they are still statutorily and politically hampered from doing so. 
Therefore, the option most likely to receive political support is option three that combines 
the ARNG and USAR and create a larger response force available to governors for 
domestic missions. The other two options, which maintain separate reserve components, 
will be easier to “sell” nationally, but will provide less benefit to the states for DSCA 
operations.  
The team is strong because one individual from each Service—the Service 
Chief—has the responsibility, the authority, and the accountability for 
providing air, sea, and land forces for the Nation. The case to change this 
is simply not compelling. I would also note that unlike the CNGB, each of 
the Service Chiefs, the Vice Chairman, and the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs is subject to the civilian oversight of a single appointed and 
confirmed Secretary. 
–GEN Martin Dempsey, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff124 
5. Support from the JCS 
This criterion is essentially the opposite of the previous criteria used, defined in 
this case as likelihood of support from the federal chain of command: Secretary of 
Defense, Chairman of the JCS, Secretary of the Army, and Army Chief of Staff. 
HLS/HLD is a DoD mission largely seen as secondary to the primary wartime mission of 
the Army, and any proposal to strengthen the HLS capabilities of the reserve component 
may be seen as a competing interest to the Army leadership. While Army leade4rship has 
clearly recognized the importance of the ARNG and USAR to the national defense 
                                                 
124 Testimony on Whether the Chief, National Guard Bureau, should be a member of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, November 10, 2011, 10.  
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strategy, interest in domestic responsibilities has been less forthcoming. The Army is 
likely to support the maintenance of two separate reserve components, as with options 
one and two, as the Guard may be viewed as too political in nature. The time-honored 
tradition of state control of the militia is likely to be viewed as a disadvantage of the NG 
by Army leadership, although it is the primary strength in terms of supporting the 
domestic mission.  
The recently passed legislation giving the Chief of NGB full membership on the 
JCS was opposed by all four service chiefs, the Chairman, and the Secretary of Defense. 
The Chairman’s (GEN Martin Dempsey) position was basically that the Army and ANG 
are already represented on the JCS by the Army and Air Chiefs. Senator Lindsey 
Graham, however, made his point clear when he asked GEN Dempsey how much contact 
he had with the TAGs (State Adjutants General), who replied “none.” When asked the 
same question, GEN McKinley’s reply was “daily.”125 The point of the exchange was 
this communication was not a priority for the Chairman, who was recently promoted 
from the Army Chief of Staff. Interestingly, GEN Amos, the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps, was the most vocal opponent of inclusion of the NGB Chief to the JCS, despite 
the fact the Marine Corps Commandant was not added as a member of the JCS until 
1979, after 20 years of lobbying for full membership.126  
The fact that this legislation passed anyway, and GEN McKinley’s testimony 
answered five primary concerns of the service chiefs, focused primarily on budget 
authority, the chief of the NGB’s statutory advisory role, as it currently exists, 
maintaining Title X command authority, and civilian oversight issues127, signifies a 
current political climate favorable to the NG. In particular, two Senators, Lindsey 
Graham (R-SC), himself a former Air National Guardsman and Air Force Reservist, and 
                                                 
125 Graham Supports National Guard Empowerment and Integration Act,” video clip, YouTube, 
November 4, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N2cy7q4CExk&feature=youtube_gdata_player. 
126 The National Guard Association of the United States, “Congressional Record on S. 3486 and H.R. 
14042 of the 95th Congress (1977–1979), Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing excerpt from 1951,” 
March 1972, http://www.ngaus.org/. 
127 The National Guard Association of the United States, “Craig McKinley, Testimony to Congress,” 
(n.d.), http://www.ngaus.org/ngaus/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000007684/mckinley111011.pdf. 
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Senator Leahy (D-VT), who co-sponsored the 2011 National Guard Empowerment Act, 
were able to overcome opposition from other Congressmen and DoD leadership. 
While the passage of the Empowerment Act is seen as a huge victory for the NG, 
Army leadership did not view it favorably. In fact, a joint letter signed by Army Secretary 
John McHugh and Army Chief of Staff GEN Ray Odierno stated, “…this legislation 
could effectively be creating a de facto separate domestic military Service by elevating 
the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to a level equal to the Chiefs of Staff of the other 
Services. This could lead to potentially divided views on global force management, 
funding, modernization, RDT&E, training, doctrine and operational concepts.”128 In 
other words, the NG is now being viewed by the Army as a competitor service rather than 
a subordinate component. Long-term effects of this rift remain to be seen, but any option 
to further strengthen the ARNG, in this case option three, will likely be opposed by Army 
and DoD leadership.  
C. RESULTS 
Table 5 represents a ranking of all three-policy options, based on the criteria 
described above, with 1 being the best option and 3 being the worst (less is better).  
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Table 5.   Analysis of Proposed Solutions (Decision Matrix) 
                                                 
128 The National Guard Association of the United States, “National Guard Empowerment Act 
Empowerment Story,” (n.d.), http://www.ngaus.org/ngaus/files/.../Empowerment%20Story.ppt. 
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D. RECOMMENDED SOLUTION 
Option three is the preferred alternative, based on a measure of the criteria 
described above. Although it requires capitulation of the USAR, which will be politically 
treacherous, the current political support of the NG is such that this argument should be 
renewed. While this solution will also likely be opposed by Army and DoD leadership, 
who have been generally averse to increased NG status, it will also create efficiencies 
that cannot be ignored in light of today’s economic challenges. Accessibility for 
HLS/HLD/DSCA missions will be greatly enhanced through implementation of this 
option, which increases the number of ARNG Soldiers available for domestic missions 
by 70 percent. This option also leaves the ARNG large enough to continue functioning as 
a fully operational reserve to the Army for future contingencies as it has done since its 
participation in the American Revolution.  
The clear advantage of Option three is the economic efficiencies to be gained by 
combining the USAR and the ARNG. Efficiencies created in manning, training, 
equipping, and administrative “overhead” will enable the NG to continue its quest to 
become the premier provider of DSCA, and also maintain itself as a highly professional, 
fully operational force. This is not to take anything away from the USAR, which has also 
deployed nearly 100% of its force overseas, and performed exceptionally well next to 
their NG and active duty counterparts. Yet, the duplication of the federal mission for the 
USAR and the ARNG, and the secondary (primary) domestic mission unique to the NG, 
combined with current fiscal challenges and postwar opportunities, make this an ideal 
time to combine these forces into one highly efficient, cohesive, strong, versatile force 
capable of deploying anywhere within or outside the United States in support of any 
assigned mission.  
Option two is more politically “sellable,” since it maintains two separate reserve 
components, and a reorganization of force structure will make both organizations more 
efficient in their core competencies. The USAR will be maintained as a “sys-admin” 
force for a leaner active component “Leviathan” force, to use Barnett’s terms.129 A 
                                                 
129 Thomas Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the 21st Century 1st ed. (Putnam 
Adult, April 22, 2004).  
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challenge of postwar planning in shaping forces for the future is to avoid the pitfall of 
“re-fighting the last war,” that is, assuming all future conflicts will resemble the 
counterinsurgency conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and assuming away large conflicts 
with nation-states. However, as Admiral Mullen said, “it’s an uncertain world,” and the 
future nature of conflict is at best an educated guess, which is affected by many factors 
beyond U.S. control. Option two provides the most flexibility, by leaving a federal 
reserve in place dedicated to the Army, and allowing the ARNG to shift focus to the 
homeland. While it will likely be more popular with Army and DoD leadership, it will 
create initial cost and turbulence that will be significant.  
Option one is essentially the “status quo” option. Sometimes the best option is to 
do nothing, and many would argue the current arrangement of the USAR and ARNG has 
been working. Clearly, reserve component participation in the GWOT would support this 
argument. However, as the Army and DoD downsize, and budgets are cut, the operational 
benefits felt by both the USAR and ARNG during the past ten years will fade away, and 
both forces will begin to experience declining readiness as resources dwindle. Doing 
“more with less” eventually becomes unrealistic, and to maintain a quality force, 
priorities must be carefully reviewed. In short, status quo is not an option. While option 
one contains the least amount of change, and will cost nothing initially, the resulting 
gradual decline in readiness and shift back to a “strategic reserve” will be a tragic waste 
of an opportunity, and will not do justice to the current quality force that the USAR and 
ARNG is.  
E. IMPLEMENTATION 
The concept of merging the ARNG and USAR has failed previously when 
proposed by two different Secretaries of Defense due to the ensuing political fight. The 
current environment lends itself to renewing the fight, particularly in light of the 
overwhelming political support for the recently passed National Guard Empowerment 
Act. The success of that initiative, based on the support of two key senators, and pushed 
along by the powerful lobbying group NGAUS, indicates a political environment ripe for 
success. While the Army Reserve has also distinguished itself during repeated 
deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, it has also struggled for relevance, reorganized 
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itself several times over the past 10 years, and is now clamoring to join in the DSCA 
arena that the NG has held the monopoly on for 375 years. Simply put, the USAR is not 
as politically powerful as the Guard, which enjoys strength from its affiliation to each 
state and territory’s governor and Congressional delegation. With support from a key 
Congressmen, such as Senator Lindsey Graham, the backing of the Council of 
Governors, and lobbying by NGAUS of its 45,000 members, this initiative could work, 
despite probable opposition from DoD. With the Chief of NGB now a full member of the 
JCS, a Vice Chief of NGB now authorized, and NG commanders at Army and Air North, 
the infrastructure is in place to effect this change.  
1. Crossing the Chasm 
Short of “bulldozing” this plan over the top of Army Reservists, careful 
salesmanship is key. While this idea will not be popular to USAR leadership, and will 
likely be opposed by Army and DoD leadership, it will be transparent not only to outside 
observers, but also to the citizen-soldiers of each service. Reservists, like Guardsmen, 
live and work in the communities they serve, and the impacts of their transitioning from 
Army Reservists to Guardsmen will be minimal. In fact, in states that provide free tuition 
at state universities, life insurance reimbursement, and other benefits to their Guardsmen, 
benefits are likely to increase for transitioning reservists. Cuts are likely to occur only at 
the senior levels, as the “peacetime overhead” involved with administering two separate 
reserve components is streamlined, but the number of individual units and Soldiers will 
remain unaffected. Lifecycle management can ease the transition of senior leaders, either 
into the ARNG or to retirement. As the ARNG assumes a larger footprint, (as many as 
18K additional Soldiers in Texas), State Joint Forces Headquarters and other 
administrative commands will need to grow to absorb some of the senior leaders from the 
USAR. Transfer of real property, facilities, and equipment must be carefully managed to 
avoid losses and waste, and the agreements with the states to help maintain armories will 
have to be negotiated when assuming federal reserve buildings. In many cases, expensive 
leases can be discarded, and reserve units relocated to existing NG facilities, or 
incorporated into programmed military construction. Successful implementation should 
be carefully planned and phased in over three to five years, modeled after a corporate 
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merger, with the idea of gaining efficiencies, but without the hostility of a takeover. An 
extensive awareness campaign for all stakeholders is key, primarily focused on USAR 
Soldiers to ensure they view the change as a positive opportunity rather than a negative 
reorganization. Retention of historical lineage and honors of USAR units is also critically 
important.  
2. Projected Outcomes 
Option three, merging the USAR and ARNG, is not a new idea and was proposed 
twice before, by Secretary of Defense Forrestal in 1947, and again by Secretary 
McNamara in 1964. Each proposal was met with fierce resistance by powerful lobby 
groups, and was ultimately defeated by Congress. The current momentum of 
Congressional support for the NG, evidenced by the success of the National Guard 
Empowerment Act, indicates the time to propose this merger again. This act, which gave 
the Chief of the NGB full membership on the JCS, was passed despite opposition by the 
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and all four service chiefs. Empowerment 
gained strong Congressional support, with 43 states having at least one Senate cosponsor, 
and eventually achieving 71 Senators in support. This support was largely due to the 
efforts of the powerful lobbying group NGAUS, a group of nearly 45,000 current and 
retired NG officers.130 
 
                                                 




Figure 4.   Guard Empowerment Act Support 2011131 
The power of the Council of Governors and adjutant generals is also evidenced by 
the quick reversal of the 2007 NDAA change to federal law allowing Presidential call-up 
of NG forces for domestic emergencies without a governor’s consent. Implemented in 
response to lessons learned during Hurricane Katrina, this law was seen as a blow to 
peacetime state control of the NG, and was quickly changed after opposition from all 50 
governors and adjutants general. The dual-status commander program, endorsed by the 
Council of Governors and implemented by NORTHCOM, also indicates an opportune 
time for this proposal. 
                                                 
131 NGAUS, “Empowerment,” (n.d.), http://www.ngaus.org/content.asp?bid=19297. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS/CONCLUSION 
The NG is currently positioned in an exciting, challenging, and pivotal time in its 
history. After ten years of war, the NG has effectively transitioned from a Cold-War, 
strategic reserve to a fully operational partner in U.S. national defense planning. The 
Chief of NGB is an equal member on the JCS and no longer subordinate to the Army or 
Air Force service chiefs who oversee the parent services of the Army and ANG. 
Qualified NG officers can serve as dual-status commanders, commanding Title 32, state 
active duty, and Title X Soldiers and Airmen in a domestic contingency operation. The 
2012 NDAA that authorized the Chief of NGB as a member of the JCS also authorized a 
three-star vice chief of the NGB, authorized NG officers to command Army North and 
Air Force North, and the commander or deputy commander of NORTHCOM has been 
mandated as a NG billet. Somewhat ironically, the impetus for increased NG relevance 
was the NG’s performance overseas and domestically in support of the GWOT, yet the 
NG has openly shifted its priority to the homeland.  
The NG is the clear front runner in the DSCA environment, and while the USAR 
is interested in domestic operations, they cannot compete with hundreds of years of 
militia tradition, an ingrained culture of domestic support, and the powerful lobbying 
abilities of the Council of Governors, Congressional delegates from every states, and the 
autonomous group of 54 Adjutants General who do not work for DoD. In today’s post-
war environment of diminished budgets, the Army and DoD must seek efficiencies and 
operating two separate reserve components of the Army is no longer feasible.  
As the Army and DoD downsizes, and cuts budgets, the NG faces the challenge of 
shifting priorities, maintaining readiness, and avoiding a gradual decline in relevance. 
Like all services, the NG must constantly seek efficiencies and ways to “do more with 
less” in a fiscally constrained environment. The active Army and the ARNG is weary 
from ten years at war, and as the Army prepares to downsize up to 90,000 Soldiers, and 
the ARNG faces increasing retention challenges, the NG must carefully manage its 
priorities to maintain a quality force. The natural shift from overseas deployments to the 
homeland provides the NG the opportunity to rest, recover, and shift focus to its historical 
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role as the primary provider of DSCA. However, the world is an uncertain place, and a 
smaller Army will always rely on the ARNG for support in future conflicts. Soldiers who 
joined the ARNG since 9/11 did not consider if they would be deployed, but when. This 
breed of Citizen-Soldier, smarter, better equipped, better trained, and with access to more 
information than ever before, must be carefully maintained, trained, equipped, cared for, 
and utilized for the service they joined.  
In addition to the proposed solution described above, the following 
recommendations should be considered as the NG strives to become the premier HLS 
force. 
 Merge the Air National Guard and U.S. Air Force Reserve  
 Make the NORTHCOM Commander a NG officer 
 Increase end strength of the NG to correspond with active component 
reductions 
 Add ADOS/AGR NG officers to the NORTHCOM Table of Distribution 
and Allowances (TDA) 
 Rotate Title 32/Title X AGR Officers between NORTHCOM, NGB, and 
the states 
 Review the force structure of the ARNG, and reduce the overall number of 
heavy units like field artillery and armor, which are not likely to be 
utilized overseas, and are of no value domestically 
 Increase the number of “sys-admin” type of units in the reserve 
component; civil affairs, psychological operations, engineer, public works, 
military police, aviation, and special forces  
 Explore the creation of a new type of unit called a security company, to be 
utilized domestically as a reaction force/support to local law enforcement, 
and overseas for security forces operations 
The NG has a long and proud history as not only the nation’s oldest military 
service, but also as a militia force accessible to the governor for local protection. As a 
force comprised of Citizen-Soldiers who live and work in the 3,300 communities 
nationwide in which they serve, Guardsmen and women are ideally suited to serve those 
communities. The dual-role mission and state relationships unique to the NG is a proud 
and time-honored element of the NG, and is in fact, the Guard’s greatest strength. While 
the NG will always remain an integral part of the National Defense Plan, its focus should 
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be domestic, and the current post-war environment provides an opportunity to shift focus 
to the homeland. Today’s NG is highly trained, well equipped, well trained, and relevant. 
With outstanding leadership, support, and resources, tomorrow’s NG will be even better.  
 
I am the Guard132 
Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War...of security and honor for three centuries I have been 
the custodian...I am the Guard!  
At Concord's bridge, I fired the fateful shot heard 'round the world. I bled on Bunker Hill. 
My footprints marked the snows at Valley Forge. With Washington on the heights of 
Yorktown, I saw the sword surrendered...I am the Guard. These things I know - I was 
there! I saw both sides of the War Between the States - I was there! The hill at San Juan 
felt the fury of my charge; the far plains and mountains of the Philippines echoed to my 
shout. In France the dark forests of the Argonne blazed with my barrage; Chateau-Thierry 
crumbled to my cannonade.  
I am the Guard. I bowed briefly on the grim road at Bataan. Through the jungles and on 
the beaches I fought the enemy...beat, battered, and broke him. I scrambled over 
Normandy's beaches - I was there! I flew MiG Alley to the Yalu - I am the Guard! I 
fought in the skies above Vietnam - I was there! In the skies and on the ground, I made 
the Arabian desert feel the fury of the storm. I am the Guard!  
Civilian in peace, soldier in war...the stricken have known the comfort of my skill. I have 
faced forward to the tornado, the typhoon, and the horror of the hurricane and the flood. I 
saw the tall towers fall - I was there!  
I am the Guard. For three centuries the custodian of security and honor, now and 





                                                 








Figure 5.   300th Armored Field Artillery in Korea133 
                                                 
133 Mort Kunstler, “Cowboy Artillery at Soyang,” Heritage Series, National Guard, (n.d.), 
http://www.ng.mil/resources/photo_gallery/heritage/soyang.html. 
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